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Abstract
Russia’s 2016 disinformation campaign during the U.S. elections represented the first
large-scale campaign against the United States and was intended to cause American citizens to
question the fundamental security and resilience of U.S. democracy. A similar campaign during
the 2016 U.K. Brexit referendum supported the campaign to leave the European Union. This
paper assesses the policy formation process in the United States and United Kingdom in response
to 2016 Russian disinformation using a bureaucratic politics framework. Focusing on the role of
sub-state organizations in policy formation, the paper identifies challenges to establishing an
effective policy response to foreign disinformation, particularly in the emergence of leadership
and bargaining, and the impact of centralization of power in the U.K. Discussion of the shift in
foreign policy context since the end of the Cold War, which provided a greater level of foreign
policy consensus, as well as specific challenges presented by the cyber deterrence context,
supplements insights from bureaucratic politics. Despite different governmental structures, both
countries struggled to achieve collaborative and systematic policy processes; analysis reveals the
lack of leadership and coordination in the United States and both the lack of compromise and
effective fulfillment of responsibilities in the United Kingdom. Particular challenges of
democracies responding to exercises of sharp power by authoritarian governments point to the
need for a wholistic response from public and private entities and better definition of intelligence
agencies’ responsibility to election security in the U.K.
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Introduction
In May 2016, Russian actors organized both sides of a political protest and counterprotest in Texas as part of their campaign to exacerbate divisions during the U.S. Presidential
election. The demonstrations were tied to anti-Muslim sentiment in the United States, with one
side opposing the “Islamization of Texas” and the counterprotest supporting Muslims.1
Threatening posts discussing the protests were reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), and the Houston City Council met to address the protests.2 The Texas protests represented
just one of a variety of approaches the Russian government used to interfere in the 2016 U.S.
election. Russia’s other efforts included running networks of social media accounts, some of
them through the Internet Research Agency (IRA), a Russian company involved in the
campaign, publishing inflammatory or false stories through Russian state-run media, and hacking
and leaking information to the media more broadly. Russia’s campaign generally attempted to
exacerbate existing polarization of the U.S. population and was intended to increase
partisanship.3 While Russia had previously engaged in disinformation campaigns, its 2016 effort
represented the first large-scale campaign directed against the United States. In targeting a highprofile event like the U.S. Presidential election, Russia’s goal was to cause American citizens to
question the fundamental security and resilience of U.S. democracy.
Russia conducted a similar influence campaign during the 2016 U.K. Brexit ballot
referendum to support the campaign to leave the European Union by using biased Russian state
media coverage and social media disinformation, though likely to a lesser extent than in the 2016
1

Donie O’Sullivan, “Russian Trolls Created Facebook Events Seen by More than 300,000 Users,” CNNMoney,
January 26, 2018, https://money.cnn.com/2018/01/26/media/russia-trolls-facebook-events/index.html.
2
Ibid.
3
Alina Polyakova, “What the Mueller Report Tells Us about Russian Influence Operations,” Brookings (blog), April
18, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/04/18/what-the-mueller-report-tells-us-aboutrussian-influence-operations/; O’Sullivan, “Russian Trolls Created Facebook Events Seen by More than 300,000
Users.”
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U.S. elections.4 Accounts connected to the IRA posted pro-Brexit messages on Twitter.5 In
addition, Russian state news sites such as Sputnik and RT (formerly Russia Today) posted a high
volume of stories during the referendum campaign, which were predominantly pro-Leave.6 The
U.K. referendum not only provided Russia with an opportunity to influence the United Kingdom,
but also to sow division and separatism within the European Union.
I will analyze the policy formation process in the United States and United Kingdom in
response to Russian interference in their democratic processes in 2016 through the lens of the
bureaucratic politics model, which conceptualizes governments as organizations comprised of
multiple actors who are constrained by their roles and engage in bargaining to form policy.
Historically, bureaucratic politics has been used to analyze the Cuban Missile Crisis and predict
antiballistic missile (ABM) deployment, aiding in examination of the process through which
states develop foreign policy.7 In the 2016 U.S. and U.K. cases, one might expect that the two
governments would respond to the disinformation campaigns with policies designed to punish
Russia and deter similar actions in the future. In fact, both governments engaged in at least some
degree of policy formation in response to Russian interference, although their policies were
viewed by some experts as slow or uncoordinated.8 In the United States, a common assumption

4

Naja Bentzen, “Online Disinformation and the EU’s Response,” European Parliament, February 2019, 2.
Bob Corker et al., “Putin’s Asymmetric Assault On Democracy in Russia and Europe: Implications for U.S.
National Security” (Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Minority, January 10, 2018),
https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/FinalRR.pdf.
6
“Putin’s Brexit? The Influence of Kremlin Media & Bots during the 2016 UK EU Referendum” (89up, February
10, 2018), https://www.89up.org/russia-report.
7
Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York, NY: HarperCollins,
1995); Jerel A. Rosati, “Developing a Systematic Decision-Making Framework: Bureaucratic Politics in
Perspective,” World Politics 33, no. 2 (1981): 234–52, https://doi.org/10.2307/2010371.1; Interestingly, the SALT
case involved Morton Halperin, at the time a Deputy Assistant Secretary
8
Franklin Foer, “Putin Is Well on His Way to Stealing the Next Election,” The Atlantic, June 2020,
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/06/putin-american-democracy/610570/; Greg Miller, Ellen
Nakashima, and Adam Entous, “Obama’s Secret Struggle to Punish Russia for Putin’s Election Assault,”
Washington Post, June 23, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/world/national-security/obamaputin-election-hacking; James Stavridis, “The Mueller Report Made It Clear: America’s Response to Russia Has
Been Far Too Weak,” Time, May 3, 2019, https://time.com/5582867/mueller-report-trump-russia-sanctions/.
5
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is that inaction was caused by President Donald Trump’s unwillingness to call the legitimacy of
his election into question. However, this view is complicated by similar inaction in the United
Kingdom, suggesting that either the challenges of responding to a fast-evolving digital threat or
more broadly applicable structural incentives to play down election interference to protect
democratic legitimacy might be relevant.
Many media outlets and some policy analysts characterized the U.S. response to Russian
disinformation as “grossly inadequate,” and President Donald Trump, the most prominent figure
in the U.S. response, was criticized for having “shown no leadership, as evidenced again by
Trump picking a fight over ‘collusion’ with the FBI after the indictments issued,” and had his
response characterized as “petulant tweets.”9 Though these assessments were promoted by
political pundits, inaction or disorganization are the dominant public narrative around the U.S.
response to Russian interference.
Due to the challenges of incomplete data, my goal is not to evaluate whether or not the
U.S. policy response was effective. Instead, my analysis of the U.S. response through the lens of
bureaucratic politics theory complicates the conventional wisdom that the U.S. policy process
was defined and stymied by partisan infighting and President Trump. My analysis relies on
publicly available information about the government response; as a result, the data available are
somewhat limited. Although official statements, hearings, and reports offer a window into the
policy process, some aspects of the policy process and outcomes were likely covert. The
November 2020 Senate report investigating the U.S. government response to 2016 election
9

Robert D Blackwill and Philip H Gordon, “Containing Russia: How to Respond to Moscow’s Intervention in U.S.
Democracy and Growing Geopolitical Challenge,” Council on Foreign Relations, Council Special Report, no. 80
(January 2018): 54; Emily Stewart, “Russian Election Interference Is Far from over. I Asked 9 Experts How to Stop
It.,” Vox, February 19, 2018, https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/2/19/17023240/election-2018-russiainterference-stop-prevent; Matthew Lee, “Trump’s Two Russias Confound Coherent US Policy,” AP News, July 1,
2020, https://apnews.com/article/donald-trump-russia-ap-top-news-national-security-vladimir-putina579c6d03c82ebb67bfd46c8c4ab4360.
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interference redacts several complete sections in the list of government actions, concealing
outcomes, as well as several paragraphs of options that were considered.10 This confirms that a
portion of both the outcomes and process are hidden from the public. Although existence of
classified data limits the ability to provide a full assessment of the success or failure of the
response, the process of forming overt government responses can be examined. As a result, my
analysis focuses on the process by which national government actors responded to 2016 election
interference, as opposed to the outcome.
I will apply bureaucratic politics theory to the policy process in the U.S. and U.K.
contexts, assessing how government actors interacted to form foreign policy. While both the
United States and United Kingdom are seen as having struggled to respond to Russian
interference, interestingly the characterization of the weakness of their policymaking processes
also seems to have differed, with the United States seen as uncoordinated and the United
Kingdom as inactive, potentially indicating different challenges or factors at play in the
bureaucratic politics model. Though the visible U.S. and U.K. responses seem surprisingly
limited, my analysis reveals that the responses were not actually that unprecedented or
unexpected given the tools available to policymakers in each case and the difficulties of
responding to disinformation, and in light of the challenges of open societies and social media in
the digital age. Although bureaucratic politics emphasizes how actors’ roles and standard
operating procedure shape their policies, it fails in part to account for geopolitical context. In
addition, bureaucratic politics anticipates that bargaining and a point person will contribute to the
policy process, yet neither represents a significant factor in my case studies. The U.K. case study,

10

“US Government Response to Russian Activities,” Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the
2016 Election (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 6, 2020),
https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report_Volume3.pdf.
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though smaller due to the more limited nature of both the Russian campaign and the associated
U.K. response, reveals the limitations of bureaucratic politics applications to systems of
government other than that of the United States for which it was tailored. The significance of
bargaining among independent actors seems greater under U.S. separation of powers, while
having less influence in a combined executive system as in the United Kingdom where power is
more centralized.

Chapter 1
In this chapter, I provide an overview of other recent disinformation campaigns and
election interference by Russia as context for the U.S. and U.K. cases. Then, I review the
bureaucratic politics literature. Finally, I discuss deterrence literature and why, although it is not
directly applicable to my analysis, it is more broadly relevant. The second chapter contains
background information on the U.S. and U.K. case studies, as well as an overview of the U.S.
and U.K. policy processes, while the final chapter contains my comparison and analysis of the
two cases.

Russian Foreign Influence
During the 21st century, disinformation has increasingly become an important, resourceefficient way for Russia to exert influence both in the near abroad (a term used to refer to former
Soviet republics) and against rivals including Western Europe and the United States. Russia’s
use of disinformation represents part of a larger, often coordinated strategy involving
cyberattacks, biased state-media coverage, economic influence, and inflammation of ethnic

11

Russian populations in the near abroad.11 While not all of these tactics have been used in every
country, in combination they reflect a broader pattern of Russian use of sharp power. Sharp
power is neither soft power, the power to attract, or hard power, military might, but rather
aggressive diplomacy and manipulation typically employed against democracies by authoritarian
governments.12 Sharp power expands a country’s influence through strategies that include
election interference, such as disinformation and leaking sensitive documents, as well as
influence campaigns taken outside of an election. Disinformation is defined as “information that
is false and deliberately created to harm a person, social group, organization or country.”13 The
problem has grown substantial enough that both the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) have established organizations dedicated to countering
disinformation, particularly from Russia.14
A review of Russia’s disinformation efforts in the former Soviet space provides context
for the two cases examined in this study because the differences and similarities across Russian
uses of sharp power in the near abroad and in the United States and United Kingdom help
illustrate Russian motivations and the relative effectiveness of various tactics in different
contexts. Past cases point to challenges to deterrence of these attacks, including attribution, the
role of state media, the determination of appropriate retaliation, and the exploitation of innate
societal divisions.

11

Stephen Flanagan et al., Deterring Russian Aggression in the Baltic States Through Resilience and Resistance
(RAND Corporation, 2019).
12
Christopher Walker and Jessica Ludwig, “The Meaning of Sharp Power,” January 4, 2018,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2017-11-16/meaning-sharp-power.
13
Claire Wardle and Hossein Derakhshan, “Information Disorder: Toward an Interdisciplinary Framework for
Research and Policy Making” (Council of Europe, September 27, 2017), https://rm.coe.int/information-disordertoward-an-interdisciplinary-framework-for-researc/168076277c.
14
“About Us | StratCom,” NATO Stratcom Centre of Excellence, https://www.stratcomcoe.org/about-us.; “EU vs
Disinformation,” EUvsDISINFO, https://euvsdisinfo.eu/.
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Russian intervention in the proposed relocation of an Estonian war memorial in 2007
represented the first of Russia’s recent forays into the use of sharp power. The Estonian case in
certain ways appeared to be a test by Russia of what it could accomplish, as the relocation of a
war memorial was an inflammatory opportunity but not as impactful as an election or military
invasion.15 Estonia’s large ethnic Russian minority, around 25% of the population, felt the
relocation of the statue commemorating the liberation of Estonia from the Nazis by the Soviet
Union marginalized them and protested.16 In addition to riots by ethnic Russians, distributed
denial of service (DDoS) attacks targeted a number of Estonian websites, including banking and
government sites.17
In general, sharp power, including cyberattacks and election interference, constitutes a
way for Russia to intervene in other countries with little to no risk of military retaliation. The
2007 Estonian cyberattacks illustrate the difficulty of clearly attributing cyberattacks to a state
actor. Challenges tracing the DDoS attacks, as well as ambiguity around whether the attacks
were carried out independently by hackers or with the help and coordination of the Russian state,
mean that these attacks have never been traced to Russia with certainty.18 However, a cyberattack
would be a logical means of Russian intervention in Estonia, whose membership in NATO
almost certainly precludes Russian military intervention. Cyberattacks offered a forceful
alternative for Russia to express its displeasure with the monument’s relocation as well as
demonstrate its influence over the ethnic Russian minority to Estonia. Some cybersecurity
experts argue that the attack was likely beyond the skill of non-state hackers or groups and

15

Flanagan et al., Deterring Russian Aggression in the Baltic States Through Resilience and Resistance, 5.
Stephen Herzog, “Revisiting the Estonian Cyber Attacks: Digital Threats and Multinational Responses,” Journal
of Strategic Security 4, no. 2 (June 2011): 49–60, https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.4.2.3.
17
Herzog, “Revisiting the Estonian Cyber Attacks.”
18
Ibid.
16
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therefore was perpetrated by a state actor.19 However, the majority position among cybersecurity
experts is that skilled hacktivists in Russia carried out the attack with the encouragement of
Russian media and political rhetoric opposed to moving the statue.20 Regardless of whether
Russian state actors carried out the attacks, the inflammatory rhetoric and stoking of ethnic
tensions through state media share characteristics, such as aggravating existing divisions and
ambiguity about the perpetrator, with Russian efforts to increase partisanship during the 2016
U.S. election.
One common characteristic of subsequent Russian disinformation campaigns in the near
abroad has been heavy reliance on state media. During the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, Russia
used state-owned media to spread disinformation and support its narrative.21 Restricted access to
disputed areas for Western journalists during the war allowed Russian reporting on events to
retain more legitimacy.22 Because Russian journalists were the only journalists allowed relatively
free access to conflict areas, others writing about the conflict zones were largely forced to rely on
Russian reports and were unable to contradict inaccuracies. Russia used this opportunity to
change the narrative of the war by inflating the death count, accusing the Georgians of genocide
and concealing damage done by Russians and separatists to Georgian villages.23 Even if Russian
allegations were not entirely convincing, the confusion and inability to debunk Russia’s claims in

19

Ibid., 53.
Ibid., 54.
21
Tom Parfitt, “Russia Exaggerating South Ossetian Death Toll to Provoke Revenge against Georgians, Says
Human Rights Group,” The Guardian, August 13, 2008, sec. World news,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/aug/13/georgia.
22
Sabrina Tavernise and Matt Siegel, “In Areas Under Russian Control, Limits for Western Media (Published
2008),” The New York Times, August 18, 2008, sec. World,
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/18/world/europe/18tblisi.html.
23
Tavernise and Siegel, “In Areas Under Russian Control, Limits for Western Media (Published 2008).” Parfitt,
“Russia Exaggerating South Ossetian Death Toll to Provoke Revenge against Georgians, Says Human Rights
Group.”
20
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combination with the short duration of the war helped Russia’s image and likely also hindered
any international response to the invasion.
The most substantial example of Russian disinformation in the near abroad occurred
during the 2014 invasion of Ukraine. Russia attempted to annex Crimea, which was followed by
the invasion of Donetsk and Luhansk, border regions to Russia, with Russian military assistance.
As of March 2021, the conflict was under a tenuous ceasefire with a recent buildup of Russian
troops near the Ukrainian border.24 Russian state media coverage of the war in Ukraine onesidedly focused on casualties and damage caused by Ukrainian attacks.25 They also published
provocative false stories, including reporting that a three-year-old had been crucified and
allegedly using one actress to play multiple characters for interviews.26 Russian cyberattacks
targeted government sites as well as power plants, and the Russian FSB, or security service,
seized VKontakte servers for access to personal data and locations of millions of Ukrainians.27
While hacking and social media are sometimes used by Russia as part of influence operations,
the contemporaneous attacks on power plants and seizure of locations of Ukrainian soldiers were
more a reflection of the hard power war than the propaganda campaign.28
Russia also used state media in several cases to spread divisive disinformation throughout
Western Europe, though to a lesser extent than in the near-abroad. Disinformation campaigns
outside of the near-abroad present greater challenges for Russia due to the smaller ethnic-

24

“Ukraine Profile - Timeline,” BBC News, March 5, 2020, sec. Europe, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe18010123; Michael R. Gordon and Georgi Kantchev, “Satellite Images Show Russia’s Expanding Ukraine
Buildup,” Wall Street Journal, April 20, 2021, sec. World, https://www.wsj.com/articles/satellite-images-showrussias-expanding-ukraine-buildup-11618917238.
25
Naja Bentzen and Martin Russell, “Russia’s Disinformation on Ukraine and the EU’s Response” (European
Parliamentary Research Service, November 2015),
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/571339/EPRS_BRI(2015)571339_EN.pdf.
26
Bentzen and Russell, “Russia’s Disinformation on Ukraine and the EU’s Response.”
27
Julia Summers, “Countering Disinformation: Russia’s Infowar in Ukraine,” The Henry M. Jackson School of
International Studies (blog), October 25, 2017, https://jsis.washington.edu/news/russia-disinformation-ukraine/.
28
Ibid.
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Russian populations and weaker penetration of Russian-language media, as well as less close
diplomatic ties. Recently, Russia has engaged in disinformation campaigns in numerous
countries outside the near abroad including Germany and France. In 2016 in Germany, a young
girl who was part of the ethnic Russian diaspora claimed to have been raped by men who looked
like migrants, triggering protests in the Russian-German community.29 In addition to reporting
heavily on the unverified and inflammatory story, Russian state media and officials created a
narrative that her allegations were not being investigated due to political correctness, attempting
to inflame anti-immigrant and anti-liberal sentiment.30 This use of Russian state media sources
primarily targeting an ethnic Russian audience in Western Europe is consistent with the approach
Russia has used in the near abroad.
Russian actions in Europe fit with the broader pattern in its use of sharp power of mixing
leaked information and outright disinformation to interfere with democracies’ domestic politics.
During the 2017 French presidential election, emails from then presidential-candidate Emmanuel
Macron’s campaign were hacked by Russian actors and leaked online by Russian state media.31
Russian state media also spread disinformation about Macron, including that he was an
American spy and was supported by Saudi Arabia, and published reports consistently biased
against him.32 While Russia employs some state media efforts when interfering in Western
countries or targeting populations other than ethnic Russians, campaigns outside the near abroad

29

Ben Knight, “Teenage Girl Admits Making up Migrant Rape Claim That Outraged Germany,” The Guardian,
January 31, 2016, sec. World news, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/31/teenage-girl-made-up-migrantclaim-that-caused-uproar-in-germany; Eliot L Engel et al., “Russian Disinformation Attacks on Elections: Lessons
from Europe,” Committee on Foreign Affairs, July 16, 2019, 78.
30
Knight, “Teenage Girl Admits Making up Migrant Rape Claim That Outraged Germany.”
31
Andy Greenberg, “The NSA Confirms It: Russia Hacked French Election ‘Infrastructure’ | WIRED,” Wired, May
9, 2017, https://www.wired.com/2017/05/nsa-director-confirms-russia-hacked-french-election-infrastructure/.
32
Reuters Staff, “French Election Contender Macron Is Russian ‘fake News’ Target: Party Chief,” Reuters, February
14, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-election-cyber-idU.S.KBN15S192; “Tackling Disinformation à
La Française,” EU vs Disinformation, April 2, 2019, https://euvsdisinfo.eu/tackling-disinformation-a-la-francaise/.
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seem to rely less heavily on state media and include more hacked information and covert social
media disinformation. The shift to hacks and leaks probably results from perceptions in further
afield countries and outside of ethnic Russian enclaves that Russian state-owned media is outside
the mainstream or less trustworthy. Thus, Russian state-owned media could be a highly effective
means to communicate a narrative to ethnic-minority Russians in Estonia or even Germany, but
less so for most of the U.S. or U.K. audience. As a result, Russia has relied more heavily on
tactics such as leaking hacked information through WikiLeaks, an entity perhaps perceived as
more state neutral, as its disinformation campaigns have shifted to the West.
Russia has engaged in a large number of other recent disinformation campaigns
throughout Europe. Between 2014 and 2018, pro-Kremlin influence was alleged in the 2014
Scottish independence referendum, 2014 Ukrainian elections, 2015 Bulgarian elections, 2015
Dutch EU-Ukraine relationship referendum, 2016 Austrian elections, 2016 Italian constitutional
referendum, 2017 German elections, 2017 Catalan referendum, 2018 Czech elections, 2018
Italian elections, and 2018 Macedonian name referendum.33 Russian influence campaigns have
continued in 2019 and onwards.34 Because of the persistent and growing Russian strategy of
using sharp power to influence other countries, particularly through disinformation, cyberattacks,
and biased Russian state-owned media, it is essential for states to develop comprehensive
policies to counter Russian influence.

33

Eliot L Engel et al., “Russian Disinformation Attacks on Elections: Lessons from Europe,” Committee on Foreign
Affairs, July 16, 2019, 78; https://www.brookings.edu/research/malevolent-soft-power-ai-and-the-threat-todemocracy/
34
For example, interference in the recent 2020 U.S. elections: “Foreign Threats to the 2020 U.S. Federal Elections,”
Intelligence Community Assessment, March 10, 2021,
https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf.
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Literature Review
Bureaucratic politics explores one of the most significant assumptions in international
relations: that states are the primary international actors. Although the state is often assumed to
be a unitary actor with coherent and consistent preferences, states can be disaggregated to reveal
multiple actors, ranging from elected officials to agencies, each of which may have different
interests or approaches to foreign policy challenges. Bureaucratic politics focuses on how
multiple sub-state actors interact to create policy, focusing on the rules that govern actors and the
personal or organizational motives driving individuals, as well as how conflicts among actors
lead to compromise.

Bureaucratic Politics
Graham Allison’s Essence of Decision discusses three approaches to states’ decision
making and uses them to analyze the Cuban Missile Crisis. Allison describes three categories
within existing theories of foreign policy action: the rational actor model, the organizational
behavior model, and the governmental politics model.35 The latter two categories fall under the
bureaucratic politics model, which I use to analyze my case studies.36 Allison asserts that the
rational actor model represents the default that has long been used to analyze international
relations and policy, while the other two models surfaced later to supplement shortcomings of
the rational actor model. Allison applies all three models to analyze the Cuban Missile Crisis,
examining their analytical power and weaknesses.

35

Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York, NY: HarperCollins,
1995), 4.
36
Jerel A. Rosati, “Developing a Systematic Decision-Making Framework: Bureaucratic Politics in Perspective,”
World Politics 33, no. 2 (1981): 234–52, https://doi.org/10.2307/2010371.
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The rational actor model assumes that the entity creating foreign policy decisions is
unitary, rational, and is located at the national level.37 The rational actor chooses a strategy in
response to the international situation, balancing costs and benefits of different policies in order
to find the net best option.38 The primary weakness of the rational actor model is that it ignores
all actions and decisions at the sub-state level, such as those of sub-state organizations and
individual bureaucrats and policymakers, despite the fact that their actions together combine to
create state-level policy that may or may not effect a grand strategy intended at the state level.
Another flaw is that when examining policies in retrospect, one can find a rational explanation
for almost any policy, making it difficult to conclude retrospectively that policies were a
uniquely rational choice, or inversely that they were irrational.39 The rational actor model is
limited by the fact that it flattens a decision-making process that includes varied organizations
and individuals interacting behind the scenes. Allison’s category of the rational actor model
includes realism, structural realism, institutionalism, and liberalism because, notwithstanding
their differences, all of those theories view states as unitary actors that make logical decisions.
Allison also discusses how Thomas Schelling’s theory of deterrence, which is discussed in more
depth below in the section on deterrence, assumes a rational actor model.
The organizational behavior model focuses on the sub-state level and the organizations
involved in foreign policy formation, such as the State Department and Department of Defense
(DoD), and implementation, and explains actions through bureaucratic patterns and
organizational procedures.40 Organizations are the medium through which policy can be created,
but they also have specific jurisdictions and are predisposed towards the status quo. The main
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characteristics of the organizational behavior model are the distribution of responsibility among
multiple organizations and the importance of organizations’ missions and scope limitations.
The third model of state decision making is governmental politics, a lens that delves even
further into the details of decision making by examining individuals. These individuals, who
make up organizations and in turn the state, can be motivated by state, organizational, or
personal incentives.41 In this model, individual actors are able to bargain for their interests based
on the amount of power they have. Presidents are able to influence policy by persuading and
negotiating with other actors, such as Congress and executive agencies, for example.42
To test their explanatory power, Allison used the three different models to analyze the
Cuban Missile Crisis case study. By analyzing the explanations offered by the organizational
behavior and governmental politics models, Allison argues that, while the rational actor model
can explain the end result, the two bureaucratic politics models reveal that the rational actor
model failed to predict other potential outcomes. The two sub-state models can explain potential
failures of states to make rational choices, and in Allison’s analysis reveal the risk of accidental
nuclear war, a scenario not anticipated by rational-actor-based Mutually Assured Destruction
models.43
In addition to Allison, the bureaucratic politics model has been used by several other
scholars. Morton Halperin applied the bureaucratic politics model to the deployment of ABMs
by President Lyndon Johnson in 1967, examining how the President, federal agencies, and
Congress were able to exert influence on the decision process. Halperin concluded that the
President made the decision to deploy the missiles as a compromise in response to bureaucratic,
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public, and Congressional pressure, and emphasized the importance of acknowledging the multiparty nature of government decision making.44 Jerel Rosati used the bureaucratic policy model to
analyze the bargaining process that resulted in the 1979 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT
1), which pitted opposing bureaucratic predispositions against each other.45
I will analyze how the United States and United Kingdom formulated policy in response
to Russian interference in their democratic processes in 2016 through the lens of the bureaucratic
politics model. I focus on assessing the influence of several key aspects of the model: standard
operating procedure, bargaining, and leadership. Bureaucratic politics developed during the
bipolar, Mutually Assured Destruction international context of the Cold War, which has since
ended, and Halperin and Allison focused on analyzing the U.S. political system. As the
bureaucratic politics model was developed in the United States in response to conventional
threats from the Soviet Union, it has limitations that may need to be supplemented in order to
apply to modern foreign policy analysis.

Institutional Structure and Foreign Policy Formation
The United States and United Kingdom both experienced Russian disinformation
campaigns during major 2016 elections, but their responses differ in a major way potentially
correlated with their distinct governmental structures. The U.S. policy formation response was
implemented by a federal system with separation of powers among the executive, legislative and
judicial branches, while the U.K. response was implemented by a parliamentary system that
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lacks a separate executive and has more centralized power. Analysis of the policy-making
process in presidential and parliamentary systems generally finds differences in how players
interact and policy develops. For example, existence of more veto opportunities, as occurs in
centralized governments, can create a choke point in which there are no independent lawmaking
bodies or less agency ability to take independent action.46
Kenneth Walz discusses the difference between the U.S. Presidential system and the U.K.
parliamentary system in Theory of International Politics, contrasting the limitations on the U.K.
Prime Minister’s power due to reliance on party support to remain in office with those of the
U.S. President, who does not rely on Congress to remain in office but whose scope of action is
limited without Congressional support.47 While U.K. Prime Ministers need support from their
parties, and coalition members if in a coalition, U.S. Presidents have a greater ability to stay in
office given their established terms but rely more on a power to persuade other decision makers
to take action, particularly when their party does not have a strong majority. Waltz argues that by
using comparative case studies, the effect of government structure on policymaking can be
separated from other factors. He also asserts that structure affects the speed of policymaking.48
For example, in systems where legislation needs to be reworked and bargained over, such as
between the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate, policymaking slows down.
In Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work, George Tsebelis simplifies the
government distinctions that affect policy making by categorizing systems based on how many
actors can veto policy and how they interact, rather than using parliamentary, semi-presidential,
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and presidential categories.49 His emphasis on veto players permits the incorporation of details
beyond the structure of a government, allowing partisan divides in government such as a split
Congress to be taken into account.50 Tsebelis criticizes the idea that politicians make rational
choices as well as the idea that governments can be neatly sorted into different categories such as
presidential and parliamentary for analysis, making the point that considerable diversity exists
even within the category of parliamentary democracies. In my analysis, I will be mindful of how
these institutional differences interact within a bureaucratic politics framework.

Deterrence
Deterrence, in particular cyber deterrence, might be expected to be an important goal of
policy responding to disinformation campaigns and provides interesting context for the case
studies. However, the rational actor model cannot be effectively applied to analyze these case
studies due to its reliance on having a comprehensive account of all government policies that
could create a deterrent, presenting an insurmountable challenge to research relying on the public
domain where some policy making is covert. Deterrence theory is categorized by Allison as a
subset of rational actor theory as it seeks to explain state actions by assuming that states make
logical decisions. The theory of deterrence, or the use of threats to prevent an actor from doing
something, has existed since at least the time of Thucydides in 5th Century BC Greece and in the
modern tradition has been used in conventional force analysis. Unitary rational actors are
important to deterrence because deterrence assumes that states make accurate cost-benefit
calculations or at least have a self-preservation instinct.51 Deterrence falls under a larger category
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of theories that Thomas Schelling discusses in his book Arms and Influence, the indirect use of
force. Deterrence theory has been used by Waltz to make the case for a nuclear Iran and by
Frank Zagare to analyze U.S. deterrence of Israel in 1967.52
Deterrence is an alternative to force that states can use to achieve foreign policy goals
and requires clear signaling to the enemy state. Traditionally, states use military force directly to
capture an objective or physically prevent an enemy from taking an objective.53 However, states
can also in many cases use indirect force to achieve their goals. Schelling discusses the indirect
use of force in which the ability to harm an opponent is used to bargain so that another state will
either refrain from doing an undesired action, which constitutes deterrence, or do a desired
action, which constitutes compellence.54 Both deterrence and compellence fall under the category
of coercion and generally require the same conditions, though compellance is more challenging
because it attempts to change established behavior. In order for a hypothetical state A to
successfully coerce state B, state A needs to communicate clearly what it wants from state B and
what it will do if state B does not comply. In addition, state A must threaten something that state
B cares about, so that state B would experience a worse outcome if it did not comply. State A
must also make state B believe that it has the capability of carrying out its threat, for example
that it possesses missiles capable of reaching state B, and that it is willing to do so and would
follow through if state B ignored the threat.55 Schelling applies deterrence theory to a
hypothetical Soviet invasion of the United States, arguing that if the United States allowed the
Soviet Union to invade California, the Soviet Union would also attempt to invade Texas on the
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basis that the United States was not committed to defending Western states. He uses this example
to illustrate how signaling and willingness are an important component of deterrence.56

Cyber Deterrence
Cyber deterrence introduces some challenges relevant to the bigger picture of countering
foreign disinformation campaigns. Schelling lays out the basic components needed for
deterrence. However, because he wrote about conventional and nuclear war in the 1960s,
Schelling’s approach to deterrence theory does not fully address certain difficulties with
deterrence that arise when attempting to deter aggression in cyberspace, including cyberattacks
and disinformation campaigns. In recent years deterrence has been extended for applications to
unconventional conflict such as in cyberspace. Cyber deterrence is deterring cyberspace attacks
by other countries; however, it does not necessarily limit deterrent options to cyberspace. For
example, a country might threaten sanctions in retaliation for a cyberattack. Deterrence in the
context of election interference, including cyber deterrence, presents several complications.
Scholars have raised concerns about the viability of deterrence in cyberspace including
evaluating the seriousness of attacks, escalation, and attribution. In 2017, Joseph Nye questioned
whether deterrence was possible in cyberspace.57 One of the main challenges is the sheer quantity
and variety of cyberattacks.58 Compared with a military invasion, it is less clear when
cyberattacks cross a threshold and merit retaliation.59 In addition, attributing cyberattacks can be
difficult, and if an attack cannot confidently be attributed, the victim may not retaliate, making it
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easier for perpetrators to avoid consequences and harder to deter attacks.60 In Cyberdeterrence
and Cyberwar, Martin Libicki explores the differences between conventional and cyber
deterrence. In addition to the issue of attribution, he discusses the risk of escalation. In
conventional or nuclear war, deterrence is less complicated because by the time an actor
retaliates, it is typically because another actor has done something extreme, like begun an
invasion or launched a nuclear attack. In cases of physical conflict, the level of damage and
appropriate corresponding retaliation is fairly easy to judge. However, in cyber deterrence, there
is a risk that retaliation will be an overreaction to the original attack and cause an escalation of
the conflict.61 A physical retaliation to an instigating cyberattack could lead the perpetrator of the
cyberattack to retaliate in kind with another physical attack, leading to a cycle of escalatory
retaliation. As many cyberattacks are low stakes compared with uses of hard power, it is less
likely that states will be willing to risk escalation to retaliate.
While recent literature exploring how deterrence can apply in cyberspace refers to
cyberattacks, not disinformation campaigns, and little has been written about deterrence of
disinformation, the same complications of deterrence also apply to disinformation. It is difficult
to determine where a disinformation campaign falls on the spectrum from small annoyance to
major damage and therefore when it merits retaliation, especially because measuring the
magnitude and determining causation of effects of state-sponsored disinformation is challenging.
It can also be difficult to attribute disinformation to a state with confidence, as was the case with
the 2007 Estonian attacks. Thus, even when it appears clear that a state has conducted a
disinformation campaign, challenges both of confirming affiliation of certain actions and of
demonstrating linkage of damage with the state campaign leave the size and damage of the
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campaign unclear, making retaliation less likely. States are also less likely to respond
aggressively if they worry about escalating the conflict. These structural pressures that dissuade
states from retaliating against cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns interfere with
deterrence because aggressor states also understand the incentives against retaliation and
therefore can feel more confident that they face minimal penalties, if any, for cyberattacks and
disinformation campaigns.
Although deterrence sheds interesting light on how Cold-War-era theories can shift in
light of modern challenges, I opt not to use the deterrence literature in my analytical framework
for several reasons. Bureaucratic politics analyses the policy process, while deterrence focuses
on assessing policy outcomes and whether or not they are consistent with successful deterrence.
Because of evidence limitations, assessing outcomes in policy countering foreign disinformation
based on information in the public domain presents significant if not insurmountable challenges.
Deterrence focuses on the end result of the policy process, which either creates a successful
deterrence relying on communication and legitimacy or fails to do so. Even in the absence of an
effective overt deterrent policy, the United States and United Kingdom may have covertly issued
threats or taken action against Russia. Therefore, evaluating the communication and legitimacy
of known U.S. and U.K. actions would not give an accurate assessment of whether the United
States or United Kingdom created effective deterrence. In addition, while deterrence theory
creates specific criteria against which to assess policies, it excludes non-deterrence policy
options, including defense, as well as policies that rely on international norms and institutions to
exert pressure to stop interference.62 While lack of access to a complete picture of the policy

62

In addition to deterrence literature, I also researched but did not include literature on information warfare, as it
primarily focuses on the strategies and cases of information warfare campaigns from the perpetrator’s side, whereas
I am focusing on how policy actors respond to it. Examples include Maria Snegovaya, “Putin’s Information Warfare

27

response prevents my from applying deterrence literature in my analysis, deterrence theory
informs my conclusion, as well as the bigger picture of how the democracies can respond to
disinformation. Deterrence not only offers an appealing policy option, but the literature also
discusses important challenges, such as escalation, attribution, and rapidly advancing technology,
to state responses to disinformation campaigns.

Bureaucratic Decision Making: Challenges in Responding to Election Interference
Disinformation presents a complex problem for democracies, and the involvement of
multiple sub-state actors in government responses makes bureaucratic politics a useful
framework for analyzing governments’ responses. Disinformation spread to influence or disrupt
an election threatens free and fair voting, a core aspect of democracies. This fundamental
entanglement in domestic politics complicates responses to election interference. Perceptions
that election interference is biased in support of one candidate or party have the potential to
undermine election integrity further because acknowledging election interference, necessary for
the clear signaling for deterrence, could damage the democratic legitimacy of individual
politicians or parties in power. Specific election interference could incentivize some politicians
to downplay interference to avoid undermining their legitimacy, making them less likely to
promote and support an aggressive response. The position of foreign election interference at the
intersection of domestic and international considerations increases the challenges to an effective
response as foreign policy organizations in the government are logically oriented towards
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international issues and may not be well equipped to deal with issues that are as much domestic
as they are foreign.
Bureaucratic politics is particularly salient to applications to foreign disinformation
policy because it considers the multiple foreign policy decision makers within the government,
as well as both individual and organizational influences. Bureaucratic politics directs attention to
factors that affect the decision-making process including institutional standard operating
procedure, bargaining, and leadership. When faced with the challenge of their status as
democracies responding to interference in an election, both the United States and United
Kingdom were viewed as responding in an uncoordinated manner or inadequately by the media
and external experts. However, paradoxically, their responses seem to have differed
significantly, with the United Kingdom offering a much less robust policy response, at least
publicly, suggesting that their uncoordinated responses originated in different organizational
challenges.
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Chapter 2: U.S. and U.K. Encounters with Russian Disinformation
Chapter 2 provides an introduction to important factors and assumptions of the
bureaucratic politics model and introduces the case studies that are used in the analysis in
Chapter 3. In Chapter 2, I begin by briefly discussing the factors that bureaucratic politics uses to
analyze how governments form foreign policy. Next, I provide background for the U.S. case
study, presenting what happened in the 2016 election to instigate the U.S. response, followed by
an overview of the U.S. response. Then, I provide background and an overview of the U.K. case
study. In doing so, I highlight the similar tactics of Russian disinformation, in contrast with the
divergent responses of the United States and United Kingdom.

Predicted Policy Process
The bureaucratic politics model provides a framework for predicting how U.S. and U.K.
policy actors would be expected to respond to an event like the Russian disinformation
campaigns in 2016. While the model does not necessarily predict specific outcomes, bureaucratic
politics proposes factors that contribute to how policy is formed. I focus on testing three factors
relevant to the U.S. and U.K. cases: standard operating procedure, leadership, and bargaining.
In the U.S. government, beyond the constitutional separation of powers among the
executive, legislative, and judiciary branches, authority is divided up among departments and
offices by purpose, with the State Department focused on diplomacy, for example, while the
DoD is in charge of military action. Actors’ options, or standard operating procedure options, are
limited and guided by their responsibilities in the government. In addition, bureaucratic politics
predicts that in a policy formation process, one actor will coordinate the response, establishing
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leadership, determined by whose area of responsibility or mission the decision falls under.63 For
example, the State Department could have primary power over diplomatic negotiations with
North Korea, consulting other agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
Cyber Command (the U.S. military command covering cyberspace) and Congress, in order to
create a policy. However, while one actor leads the response and is responsible for coordinating
and implementing the policy as the point person, the actual policy comes about as a result of
bargaining and communication among stakeholders reflecting their different interests.
Governmental actors have specific responsibilities, as well as past experience in
responding to challenges.64 Typically, actors work within their defined area of responsibility in
the government. When changes are necessitated by disasters or significant disruptions,
organizations rely on past experience to adjust to the new situation.65 While Russian information
warfare is seen as somewhat novel, especially against the United States and United Kingdom,
there is historical precedent for interference in other countries’ domestic politics. Therefore, it
would make sense that relevant actors, such as the State Department, FBI, and Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), might turn to precedent to guide action. The President and Congress
might also rely on precedent somewhat for guidance; however, these actors generally do not
have the same institutional memory because of turnover and partisan shifts. Instead, partisan
actors have particularly strong individual motivations, such as the desire to be reelected or gain
influence. Bureaucratic politics also predicts that the President would rely on persuading or
negotiating with agencies, such as DHS, FBI, and DoD, to gain their compliance with the chief
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executive’s preferred policy.66 While Presidents have strong influence, they are not always
successful, and it is particularly challenging for Presidents to prevent policy actions by other
organizations.

Russian Interference in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election
Russian election interference leading up to the 2016 U.S. Presidential election
represented the first high profile, coordinated domestic or foreign attempt to influence and
mislead U.S. voters during an election, bringing disinformation and election interference to new
prominence.67 The effects of and specific motivations behind Russia’s actions have been widely
debated; indeed, the very existence of Russian interference has been questioned, particularly by
former President Trump and his surrogates. However, investigative reports have established
more details over time, and experts now widely agree that the Russian government engaged in an
organized campaign to interfere with the 2016 U.S. election, with remaining uncertainty
primarily centering around the campaign’s goals and effectiveness.68 Resulting fears about the
security and independence of the U.S. electoral process, as well as the potential for future
election interference, prompted U.S. federal government investigations and actions. Russian
actions in the 2016 election were sufficiently threatening to U.S. democracy and damaging to
public perception that the U.S. government would be expected to have responded strongly to
preclude and deter future Russian and foreign electoral interference. This policy overview
describes publicly disclosed U.S. responses to Russian interference in late 2016 through the 2018
midterms. Most broadly, it demonstrates that the policy response was neither as coordinated nor
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robust as a bureaucratic politics approach might anticipate. This section provides a summary of
broadly accepted events in Russia’s interference in the 2016 election, reviewing the role of actors
including the Democratic National Committee (DNC), Russian Main Directorate intelligence
agency (GRU), and IRA.

Russian Disinformation and Hacking
The high profile and contentious nature of the 2016 Presidential election and the
extensive news coverage the campaign generated provided an ideal opportunity for interference
and dissemination of disinformation. Private and government investigations have established that
Russia began preparing to interfere in the U.S. election as early as 2014, and its hacking, leaking,
and social media campaign peaked in mid to late 2016.69 Russian election interference included
coordinated social media campaigns, sophisticated hacking operations against political groups
and election infrastructure, and leaking information with the help of groups such as Wikileaks. In
addition, American news media and individuals on social media amplified Russian interference
by further spreading controversial or engaging information.
Beginning in March 2016, the GRU attempted to compromise emails and private
computer systems related to Hillary Clinton’s Presidential campaign and the Democratic Party.70
The hackers used phishing emails to install malware on computers connected to the Democratic
Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) and then DNC networks. The malware allowed the
GRU to track keystrokes and take screenshots, providing access to emails, campaign research,
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and staffer bank account information.71 The leaked information included disparaging comments
made internally about Democratic Presidential primary competitor Senator Bernie Sanders.72
After acquiring sensitive, controversial information from the DNC, the information was leaked
online through a variety of channels not directly associated with Russia, including WikiLeaks,
DCLeaks, and Guccifer 2.0, that were designed to obscure the source of the information.73
Among the leaked DNC emails was one discussing President Barack Obama’s reticence to help
fundraise, exclaiming “He really won’t go up 20 minutes for $350k? THAT’S f---ing stupid,”
and an email suggesting attacking candidate Bernie Sanders for alleged atheism.74 Overall, the
Russian government attempted to create division within the Democratic party, as well as stoke
animus against Hillary Clinton.
In addition, throughout the 2016 election campaign, Russian actors such as the IRA used
networks of accounts on global social media platforms to engage U.S. voters and spread
disinformation. Employees of the IRA used bots and networks of accounts to spread false and
divisive content by posting from accounts impersonating Americans, sharing each other’s posts
to spread the content further. IRA employees posed as both conservative and liberal personas,
often presenting themselves as U.S. organizations affiliated with politics or grassroots
organizations such as Black Lives Matter or the Tea Party, allowing them to feed off those
groups’ popularity.75 In addition, the IRA purchased political advertisements on social media
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sites, including an advertisement recruiting young people for a pro-Trump group labelled
#KIDSFORTRUMP, and directly messaged genuine U.S. political groups such as regional Tea
Party groups in an attempt to cooperate in planning events.76 The IRA additionally made use of
bot networks, large numbers of automated accounts, to amplify their posts.77 By relying on these
strategies to increase their chance of going viral, IRA posts reached at least 29 million
Americans on Facebook alone during the election campaign.78
The impact of Russian disinformation was not limited to cyberspace. The IRA organized
real-world events remotely from Russia by creating and using paid Facebook advertising to
promote events. As noted in the Introduction, IRA-created Facebook pages called The Heart of
Texas and United Muslims of America organized a simultaneous protest and counter-protest in
Houston in May 2016.79 According to photos of the event, the event drew at least several dozen
protestors on each side.80 In addition, in another case, an IRA-backed Facebook page called
BlackMattersUS organized a march from Union Square to Trump Tower in New York City
attended by between five and ten thousand people.81
According to U.S. intelligence committee assessments, information published on Russian
news sites was consistent with Russia’s approval of Trump and disapproval of Clinton, and
helped spread hacked emails from the Clinton campaign and DNC.82 During the 2016 election,
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Russian state-owned English-language media, including RT, supported Donald Trump through
English-language articles and videos and argued that he was unfairly targeted by traditional,
establishment U.S. media sites, including in a video featuring WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange
titled “Trump Will Not Be Permitted To Win.”83 Russian state-owned media portrayed Hillary
Clinton as corrupt and extensively covered the hacked DNC emails.84 Coverage of Clinton
included videos titled “Julian Assange Special: Do WikiLeaks Have the E-mail That’ll Put
Clinton in Prison?” and “Clinton and ISIS Funded by the Same Money.”85
In addition to disinformation-related election interference, a U.S. Senate Intelligence
investigation concluded that Russia engaged in cyberattacks against U.S. election infrastructure,
including voting websites, machines, and companies that provide voting services and machines.86
This effort was less high profile, and despite successfully gaining access to some state election
systems, Russia is not known to have exploited its success.87 However, Russia could have
potentially used its access to disrupt U.S. voting systems, for example by changing voter
registration information or even result tallies, which would have caused confusion and mistrust.88
The U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence found there was no evidence that vote tallies
or voter rolls were changed, and Russia’s efforts are viewed by U.S. intelligence agencies as
probable reconnaissance in anticipation of future efforts or an attempt to disrupt confidence in
electoral systems. 89
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U.S. Perceptions of Russian Motivations
U.S. perceptions of Russia’s goals in its election interference campaign have could
affected how threatened the United States felt, and therefore the strength of U.S. response.
Factors affecting the U.S. response will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. Possible
Russian goals include changing the election outcome, undermining confidence in U.S.
democracy, and increasing polarization in U.S. politics, though these objectives are not mutually
exclusive. Though there are a number of potential Russian motives for the campaign, the most
prominent interpretation, including by U.S. intelligence agencies, is that “Russia’s goals were to
undermine public faith in the U.S. democratic process, denigrate Secretary Clinton, and harm her
electability and potential presidency” as well as “help President-elect Trump’s election
chances.”90 Other proposed separate or additional motivations for Russia include revenge against
alleged previous U.S. interference in Russian democracy, the desire to weaken the U.S.
Presidency, and general “ambivalence towards the West.”91 Given that the Russian government
has not openly admitted to electoral interference or discussed its motivations, assertions about
motive are based on either non-public, classified information or strategic and historic analysis of
Russia’s actions. However, for the purposes of this project, it is not necessary to know the
Russian government’s precise motive in order to analyze the U.S. government’s response.
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Effects of Election Interference in the United States
Conclusions about the effectiveness of Russian election interference vary because the
assessment depends significantly on what Russia’s goals are believed to have been, which as
noted cannot be conclusively determined. In addition, while the complexity and multiple inputs
involved make it impossible to reach definitive conclusions about Russia’s success in, for
example, changing the election result, there is a correlation between Russia’s actions and an
increase in U.S. political polarization. Without being able to establish causation, in 2016 U.S.
partisanship hit a new high, with over 50% of voters viewing the other party very unfavorably,
while confidence in U.S. elections seemed unaffected both during and after the election.92
Although investigations found no evidence that Russia exploited its access to election
infrastructure to change vote tallies or voter rolls, given the large number of impressions, or
views and interactions, that the IRA alone achieved on social media, IRA propaganda may have
had some effect on voters’ choices.93 It is impossible to know how many voters, if any, the IRA
and other sources of Russian disinformation may have swayed, and because of Donald Trump’s
small margin of victory in crucial states in the 2016 election, multiple factors could have tipped
the election.
According to the 2017 Intelligence Community Assessment and Senate Intelligence
Committee Reports, it is more likely that Russia’s primary objective was to further polarize
American voters and reduce confidence in U.S. democracy, with any ability to swing the election
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in favor of a friendlier candidate being tangential and perhaps unexpected.94 Like influence on
voter decisions, polarization and mistrust are subjective, and a direct cause-and-effect linkage is
difficult to establish.

U.S. Response to Russian Election Interference
The U.S. government adopted a number of policies in response to Russian interference
with the 2016 U.S. election. My analysis includes official federal government actions in response
to 2016 Russian disinformation, including reports, hearings, legislation, executive orders, and
actions taken under existing law. I examined the congressional records for relevant bills, in
addition to relevant committee websites for hearings and press releases. In addition, I looked for
all Whitehouse.gov press releases and executive orders on Russian disinformation. In order to
find less-publicized actions such as Cyber Command operations, as well as assemble a complete
picture of U.S. actions, I consulted think tank reports on U.S. policy actions. I exclude lower
investment and impact activities such as public remarks by the President, legislators, and agency
spokespeople and the Presidential signing of previously passed bills. However, relevant public
remarks will be included in my analysis of U.S. policy formation and actors. I include federal
government policies implemented prior to the 2018 U.S. midterm elections, including a few
policies that were put in place before the end of the 2016 election as preliminary responses once
the United States realized that Russia was interfering in the election. Policies established after
the 2018 election are excluded for several reasons. First, policies implemented after 2018 were
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delayed enough to not be in place to protect the next major U.S. election after 2016 and thus
were too late to deter Russia from further interference past 2016. Second, whether antidisinformation policies put in place after the 2018 election represent responses to Russian
election interference in 2016 or new responses to interference in 2018 is ambiguous. In addition,
other than the Mueller report, which primarily focused on the Trump campaign, there were no
major public actions in process before 2018 that had yet to be completed or published in an
interim report so post-2018 legislation or prosecutions would either have been non-public or
started after and potentially in response to the 2018 midterms.

U.S. Actors
The three types of U.S. actors involved in federal disinformation policies are the
President, the legislative branch or Congress, and executive branch agencies. Actions taken by
each group vary because of their different legal authority. For example, legislative policies
mostly consist of reports and laws passed by Congress. In addition, the elected, more partisan
character of the executive and legislative branches contrast with that of the executive agencies,
which include a multitude of career bureaucrats and are seen as comparatively objective and
nonpartisan.
The executive branch, despite its traditionally central role in foreign policy, has done
relatively little with regards to disinformation in the 2016-18 period, with the bulk of Presidential
actions consisting of supporting other actors such as Congress and the Director of National
Intelligence (DNI), as well as intermittent public statements. In part this is probably because the
ability to negotiate treaties, an essential part of executive power over foreign policy, has not been
used in disinformation policy thus far. As a result, beyond a small number of executive orders,
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most Presidential involvement in anti-disinformation policy has been limited to signing or
implementing legislative policy through executive agencies and making public statements about
the threat of Russian interference or lack thereof.95 Executive disinformation policies consist of
two distinct periods: the Obama era, covering a few months before and immediately after the
election, and the Trump era, covering the majority of the U.S. response through 2018.
Presidential executive orders on disinformation together compose one sequence, in which
President Trump extended a prior executive order issued by President Obama that created
sanctions against top Russian intelligence actors and companies involved in the campaign for
election interference.96
The legislative branch has used three main methods to respond to Russian interference:
legislation, hearings, and committee reports on Russian disinformation. Between 2016 and 2018,
Congress introduced several bills in response to disinformation and passed several pieces of
legislation as part of larger bills. Congress also held five open hearings on Russian
disinformation in the 2016 election, and several committees published reports investigating
Russian interference.97
U.S. executive agencies represent the third group of actors involved in the policy
response to Russian election interference. Federal agencies, including the Intelligence
Community, the umbrella organization for all U.S. intelligence agencies organized by the DNI,
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as well as individual agencies such as the National Security Agency (NSA), DHS, and FBI, as
well as DoJ, are the most varied policy actor group, differing in size, powers, and history. Due to
their significant number of career bureaucrats with varying personal party affiliations, they are
generally considered nonpartisan relative to elected offices such as the Presidency and Congress
and often work together to counter disinformation, engaging in overlapping categories of actions
such as investigation and issuance of reports. Overall, executive agencies have taken the largest
quantity of actions; however, this stems in part from the large number of agencies involved in
responding to Russian election interference, as well as the iterative nature of some reports and
investigations. Collectively, executive agencies were primarily involved in investigating and
reporting on Russian disinformation, while some agencies such as the NSA and DoJ took action
based on their delegated powers.

U.S. Response Timeline
Between 2016 and 2018, federal actions evolved from preliminary reports and hearings to
sanctions and prosecutions, as well as organizational changes to help improve future federal
coordination and response. The U.S. response to Russian election interference appears to have
been uncoordinated, primarily consisting of investigations, hearings, and reports, as well as
indictments and sanctions that will not realistically affect the targeted individuals. While the U.S.
took some punitive actions, those prosecutions and sanctions impact a small number of low-level
players on the Russian side, as opposed to broad, aggressive sanctions or ones targeted against
key decision makers. Overall, the United States lacked a coordinated, whole-of-government
approach in the response to Russian disinformation.
2016
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The initial U.S. response to Russian interference was slowed by President Obama’s
concerns about appearing to interfere in the ongoing democratic election or undermining public
confidence in voting systems.98 The first federal response to the 2016 Russian election
interference was not until October 7, 2016 when a statement was issued by the Intelligence
Community attributing the email hackings against Democrats and the Clinton campaign during
the election to Russia, arguing that the hackings were believed to be ordered by senior-most
Russian officials and stating that state election systems had been scanned though those actions
could not yet be attributed to Russia.99
In December 2016, shortly after the election, Congress passed the National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2017, which established the Department of State
Global Engagement Center.100 The Global Engagement Center was established to lead U.S.
government efforts to understand and counter foreign disinformation undermining U.S. national
security.101
On December 29, 2016, the DHS, Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI),
and the FBI issued a Joint Analytical Report (JAR) building on the brief October statement.102
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The JAR primarily provided technical details on the attacks and was meant to provide private
sector companies with the ability to identify and report attacks.103
In addition in December 2016, in the first attempt at retaliation, President Obama issued
an executive order sanctioning Russian intelligence agencies, officers, and companies involved
in the election interference and authorizing Treasury to impose sanctions for disinformation or
cyberattacks.104 However, President Obama did not directly retaliate against Russian President
Vladimir Putin, and the targeted individuals likely had no U.S. assets that would be impacted.105
President Obama also announced the closing of two Russian compounds in the U.S. used for
intelligence purposes and expelled 35 Russian diplomats.106 While the diplomatic actions were
taken through the authority of the State Department, they were part of President Obama’s
coordinated response to Russian election interference and announced as part of his
administration’s policy response.107
2017
On January 6, 2017, the ODNI issued the first substantive investigation of election
interference, an Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA) that concluded that Russia interfered
in the U.S. election in favor of President Trump and additionally that the interference was
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ordered by President Putin.108 In addition, the intelligence agencies concluded that Russia posed a
threat to future elections.109 This report was the basis for the January 10 Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence hearing, and also created controversy in Congress and U.S. news media over
whether Russian interference was in favor of Trump.110
During the first half of 2017, various Congressional committees held hearings on Russian
disinformation. On January 10, 2017, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence held the first
of several open hearings, and included the DNI and the Directors of the CIA, NSA, and FBI.111
The hearing discussed the ICA from January 6, 2017 that concluded that Russian interference in
the 2016 U.S. election was ordered by Putin and that Russia wanted to help President-Elect
Trump.112 After Donald Trump’s January 20 inauguration, in March 2017, the Committee held
two back-to-back hearings called "A Primer in Russian Active Measures and Influence
Campaigns,” providing an overview of past Russian disinformation, including that related to the
2016 election.113 In June 2017, the Committee held a hearing covering what happened in the 2016
election and looking ahead to elections in 2018 and 2020.114 The hearing included two panels, the
first comprised of FBI and DHS officials and focused on the events of 2016 and the federal
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response.115 The second panel included state election officials and was meant to explore how the
federal government could assist states to secure election infrastructure.116
In August 2017, Congress passed the Countering America’s Adversaries Through
Sanctions Act (CAATSA) of 2017, which codified into law sanctions imposed by President
Obama’s December 2016 executive order, preventing President Trump from lifting them through
executive order.117 In addition, it mandated new sanctions for election interference and expanded
existing sanctions.118 In both 2017 and 2018, President Trump issued Presidential memoranda
implementing the 2017 and 2018 CAATSA.119 However, President Trump expressed disapproval
of CAATSA, particularly sanctions against Russia, and the policy was driven by Congress not
the President.120
In Fall 2017, FBI Director Christopher Wray created the Foreign Interference Task Force
(FITF).121 The FBI has primary responsibility for investigating foreign influence, and the FITF is
involved in investigating as well as communicating threats by foreign entities to other
government and private entities.122 In addition, in November 2017, the DoJ mandated that RT and
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its global distribution agent register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA).123
FARA requires foreign agents to register as well as label their broadcasts for transparency.124
This decision was partially based on the 2017 ICA, which included discussion of RT’s
involvement in 2016 election interference.125 In December 2017, Congress passed the Fiscal Year
2018 NDAA. The legislation included a section building on a bill that had been previously been
introduced in the Senate, called the Countering Foreign Propaganda and Disinformation Act.126
The 2018 NDAA required cooperation between the DoD and the State Department on foreign
disinformation and strengthened the Global Engagement Center.127
2018
In February 2018, the DOJ charged 13 Russian individuals and three companies for their
interference in the U.S. political system, including the 2016 Presidential election, as part of the
special counsel investigation into the 2016 election.128 Twelve of the individuals were employees
of the IRA, while the last one was Yevgeniy Prigozhin, the oligarch who funded IRA
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activities.129 The charges related to the activities of the IRA.130 In March 2018, President Trump
signed an executive order extending the emergency declaration from Obama’s December 2016
executive order by one year.131 This extended the specific sanctions in the individual order, as
well as the authority of the Department of Treasury to sanction individuals under it. The House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence issued a report in March 2018 on its investigation
of Russia’s interference in the 2016 election agreeing with most of the Intelligence Community’s
prior assessments, except for the allegation that President Putin preferred Trump to Clinton.132 In
June 2018, the Committee had a hearing on the U.S. policy response to Russian election
interference that involved both looking back at 2016 as well as recommendations for future
policies to combat election interference.133
While the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence did not publish a final report on
Russian election interference before the 2018 midterms, in July 2018 the Committee published
its findings to date.134 The preliminary report supported the January 2017 ICA’s findings, both
through examination of the evidence as well as intelligence agencies’ analytical processes, and
agreed with the assessment that Russia favored President Trump in the 2016 election.135 In
addition, in July 2018, the DoJ brought charges against eleven additional Russian individuals,
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primarily for hacking into organizations involved in Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign and
leaking hacked documents.136 The charges were brought against the individual Russian
intelligence officers who carried out the scheme, not higher-level policymakers who might have
ordered the attack.137
During 2018, the federal government also prepared for potential Russian interference in
the upcoming midterm elections. Following the July indictment, U.S. Cyber Command and the
NSA engaged in cyber operations preparing preemptively for the 2018 midterm elections and
reportedly both outed Russian operatives and passed information to the DHS and the FBI.138 In
July 2018, the DOJ Cyber Digital Task Force issued its first report on how the DOJ was dealing
with cyber threats.139 The report described DOJ preparations for the 2018 midterms, including
investigating and prosecuting violations of FARA, sharing threat information, and working with
private companies.140
The 2019 NDAA was passed in August 2018, before the midterm elections. The 2019
NDAA modified the Global Engagement Center’s description to add greater emphasis on
protecting U.S. and allies’ national security interests.141 In addition, it directed the President to
designate a National Security Council (NSC) employee to coordinate executive agencies’ antidisinformation efforts.142
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In September 2018, shortly before the U.S. midterm elections, President Trump issued an
executive order requiring post-election assessments of foreign interference in U.S. elections
coordinated by the DNI and sanctions in response to election interference.143 The September
2018 executive order built upon the previous emergency declarations in March 2018 and
December 2016, and was intended to establish sanctions for interference in the November 2018
midterms and a consistent post-incident analysis process.
Overall, the public U.S. government response to Russian election interference seems
surprisingly limited, particularly in light of the high profile and high stakes nature of the Russian
campaign. Russia attempted to disrupt the U.S. Presidential election, and the U.S. response
primarily consisted of holding investigative hearings and issuing reports. Despite a few
prosecutions and sanctions, there appear not to have been deterrent or retaliatory measures
against high-level officials in positions to control Russian election interference policy, such as
President Putin. Without retaliatory actions against decision makers, U.S. actions cannot serve as
effective deterrence against future Russian interference in U.S. elections. While actions such as
FARA designation for RT potentially help the U.S. achieve some deterrence through denial,
making it more difficult for Russia to influence U.S. voters, they do not meaningfully increase
the cost to decision makers and motivate them not to interfere.

Russian Interference in the 2016 U.K. Brexit Referendum
At the same time as the U.S. presidential campaign was ramping up and Russian actors
were hacking the DNC and spreading disinformation, a shorter, more limited election
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interference campaign took place in the United Kingdom. In 2016, the United Kingdom had a
referendum on whether to leave the EU.144 The Brexit referendum campaign was contentious,
involving emotive rhetoric about sovereignty, healthcare funding, and loss of economic
prosperity.145 On June 23, 2016, a slim majority of the United Kingdom voted to leave the EU,
triggering Prime Minister David Cameron’s resignation and a separation process that has only
recently been concluded in January 2021.146
In late 2015, as the EU referendum campaign was beginning in the United Kingdom,
Arron Banks, one of the co-founders of the Leave.EU campaign and the largest individual
political donor in the United Kingdom, met with the Russian ambassador to the United Kingdom,
allegedly discussing the upcoming EU referendum and opportunities to invest in gold.147 The
source and extent of Banks’ wealth is unclear, and given his numerous overseas business
connections and offers, some have charged that the money for his donations came indirectly
from outside the United Kingdom, funneling Russian money into U.K. politics.148
In contrast to the 2016 U.S. Presidential election, Russian interference in the Brexit
campaign came to light slowly and its extent remains more contested. A U.K. government report
published more than three years after the referendum concluded that Russian interference in the
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referendum was “unquantifiable.”149 However, the report also acknowledged that the U.K.
government did not investigate whether Russia interfered in the referendum.150 Although that
lack of investigation means the extent and specifics of interference are less clear than in the
United States, Luke Harding, a Guardian journalist with experience in Russia, argued that the
U.K. government is “in denial” about interference.151 Additionally, studies by UC Berkeley and
the University of Edinburgh found that social media accounts tied to Russian interference were
active in posting about the Brexit referendum.152 However, retrospective academic research has
been hindered by the deletion of data, such as when Twitter accounts involved in spreading
disinformation during the referendum were deleted for spreading disinformation.153 Because of
this paucity of research, there is considerably less debate and speculation about topics like
Russia’s motives and impact on the Brexit referendum than in the U.S. case.
While no comprehensive database of accounts and tweets from Russian actors in the
Brexit referendum exists, examination of a list of 2752 IRA-linked accounts that spread
disinformation and divisive content in the U.S. election allowed researchers from the University
of Edinburgh to identify 419 accounts that also posted several thousand times about Brexit or
Brexit-related topics such as the European Union and migration.154 While interference in the U.S.
election took place through months of campaigning, Brexit interference through social media
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was concentrated around the election day: just two weeks before the vote only about 1000 posts a
day appeared from Russian actors related to the Brexit referendum.155 The day before and after
the referendum, Russian Twitter accounts, many of which were bots, posted nearly 45,000 times
about Brexit according to a report from UC Berkeley and Swansea University.156 One account
called for the British to vote to “make June the 23rd our Independence Day.”157 According to
89up, a communications company cited in the U.K. post-incident Parliamentary analysis,
Russian bots created over 10 million potential impressions during the referendum campaign,
nearly a third the reach of the official Leave.EU Twitter account.158
In addition, Russian state news actively posted articles about the Brexit referendum.
Sputnik and RT posted over 250 Brexit-related articles in 2016 prior to the referendum, which
were typically pro-Leave.159 These articles created up to 134 million impressions, while the Vote
Leave and Leave.EU websites combined had 44 million potential impressions.160
Although Russian interference in the U.K. Brexit campaign was on a smaller scale and
lower profile than in the 2016 U.S. election, interference did occur. Russia used existing social
media accounts, including bots, to comment on the Brexit referendum, and also successfully
spread anti-EU stories through RT and Sputnik. As with the U.S. election, it is impossible to
know how impactful Russian interference was on the United Kingdom’s vote to leave the EU;

155

David D. Kirkpatrick, “Signs of Russian Meddling in Brexit Referendum,” The New York Times, November 15,
2017, sec. World, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/15/world/europe/russia-brexit-twitter-facebook.html.
156
Reuters Staff, “Russian Twitter Accounts Promoted Brexit Ahead of EU Referendum: Times Newspaper,”
Reuters, November 15, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-eu-russia-idU.S.KBN1DF0ZR.
157
Reuters Staff, “Russian Twitter Accounts Promoted Brexit Ahead of EU Referendum.”
158
89up, “Putin’s Brexit? The Influence of Kremlin Media & Bots during the 2016…,”
https://www.slideshare.net/89up/putins-brexit-the-influence-of-kremlin-media-bots-during-the-2016-uk-eureferendum; “Disinformation and ‘Fake News’: Final Report - Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee - House
of Commons.”
159
“Putin’s Brexit? The Influence of Kremlin Media & Bots during the 2016 UK EU Referendum” (89up, February
10, 2018), https://www.89up.org/russia-report.
160
“Putin’s Brexit? The Influence of Kremlin Media & Bots during the 2016 UK EU Referendum.”

53

however, as in the U.S., the EU referendum result had a narrow margin. Because of the narrow
margin, any number of factors could have tipped the vote to either side.

U.K. Response to Russian Interference in the Brexit Referendum
According to a member of Parliament in the aftermath of the Brexit referendum, “The
outrage isn’t if there is interference; the outrage is no one wanted to know if there was
interference.”161 As far back as 2016, the U.K. government’s response to allegations of Russian
interference in the Brexit referendum campaign has been focused on denial and downplaying.162
Public communication in the United Kingdom about Russian disinformation was
inconsistent. In November 2017, U.K. Prime Minister Theresa May, who took over from David
Cameron with a promise to facilitate Brexit, attacked Russia in a speech for election interference,
saying that Putin was trying to “undermine free societies.”163 The BBC called her comments a
“stark contrast to those of U.S. President Donald Trump” who at the time claimed that he
believed President Putin’s denials that it interfered in the U.S. 2016 election.164 In response to her
speech, a former Labour cabinet minister asked “why May [was] suddenly acknowledging
Russian interference now having stonewalled for months.”165 The U.K. government demonstrated
much greater hesitance to investigate or acknowledge allegations of Russian disinformation.

161

Mark Landler and Stephen Castle, “‘No One’ Protected British Democracy From Russia, U.K. Report
Concludes,” The New York Times, July 21, 2020, sec. World,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/21/world/europe/uk-russia-report-brexit-interference.html.
162
Arne Delfs and Henry Meyer, “Putin’s Propaganda Machine Is Meddling With European Elections,”
Bloomberg.Com, April 20, 2016, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-20/from-rape-claim-to-brexitputin-machine-tears-at-europe-s-seams; “Russia” (Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, July 21,
2020),
https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20200901112439/https://docs.google.com/a/independent.gov.uk/viewer?
a=v&pid=sites&srcid=aW5kZXBlbmRlbnQuZ292LnVrfGlzY3xneDo1Y2RhMGEyN2Y3NjM0OWFl; Landler and
Castle, “‘No One’ Protected British Democracy From Russia, U.K. Report Concludes.”
163
“Theresa May Accuses Vladimir Putin of Election Meddling,” BBC News, November 14, 2017, sec. UK Politics,
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-41973043.
164
“Theresa May Accuses Vladimir Putin of Election Meddling.”
165
Ibid.

54

The U.K. government did eventually begin an investigation into Russian disinformation
in the Brexit referendum. In late 2017, more than a year after the Brexit vote, the Digital,
Culture, Media, and Sport Select Committee, a committee in the British House of Commons,
began an investigation into disinformation online.166 Though the inquiry focused on
disinformation in general, it included some research into Russian election interference, including
during the Brexit referendum. Starting in late 2017, several months after the referendum, the
inquiry requested information from Facebook about disinformation. Though Facebook did not
share any data on Russian influence networks, it shared limited data about advertising and
unrelated disinformation.167 The interim report issued by the select committee in July 2018
contained research on foreign disinformation during the 2016 referendum, citing academic
studies, and Leave.EU and Arron Banks’ potential ties to Russia.168 The National Crime Agency
(NCA), the U.K.’s lead law enforcement agency against cybercrime, organized crime, and
economic crime, investigated the allegations against Arron Banks and in September 2019 found
that the money donated to Leave.EU came from his company and was not laundered for
Russia.169 However, the NCA did not rule out investigating him for other overseas criminal
business, implying that his overall wealth and ability to donate could rely on foreign
opportunities and connections.170 The final report of the Digital, Culture, Media, and Sport Select
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Committee, published February 2019, contained less detail, simply stating the government
cannot say that there was “no evidence of successful interference” and recommended that the
U.K. government publicize any inquiries into election interference and commission an
independent inquiry.171 In January 2018, the U.K. government created a new national security
unit dedicated to combating disinformation.172 The National Security Communications Unit was
created in order to better deter opponents from election interference and disinformation.173
In July 2020 the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) of Parliament released the
final public report on Russian interference in the United Kingdom overall.174 The ISC began
investigating Russian interference in U.K. democracy in November 2017.175 Despite being
completed over a year earlier, its publication was delayed by the U.K. government, supposedly
due to normal procedural actions like redaction and the need to reconstitute the committee after
the 2019 election.176 However, the committee’s previous chair called the reasons for the delay
“entirely bogus,” and Prime Minister Boris Johnson was accused of delaying the report because
of his party’s ties to Russian oligarchs.177 The report failed to ascertain whether Russia interfered
in the EU referendum, emphasizing primarily the lack of U.K. investigation into potential
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interference, rather than evaluation of the alleged interference itself.178 When asked for evidence
about Russian interference in the Brexit referendum, MI5, the United Kingdom’s main domestic
intelligence agency, responded with only six lines of text and a reference to public academic
studies.179 The report nonetheless recommended that the U.K. intelligence community investigate
and publish a report on Russian interference in the UK referendum; however, a public report has
not yet been published as of May 2021.180
Overall, the U.K. response to 2016 Russian election interference has been slower and
even less thorough than the U.S. response, in addition to being similarly uncoordinated. It is
notable that U.K. government agencies pointed to private academic research, instead of offering
information based on their own research and intelligence, when asked about their knowledge of
the extent of Russian interference in the Brexit referendum.181 Unlike in the United States, the
U.K. response did not include any punitive actions such as prosecutions or sanctions. The United
Kingdom appears to be several steps behind the United States in reacting to Russian actions,
having stalled before completing investigations into the presence of interference in the Brexit
referendum. The United States and United Kingdom faced similar challenges, each experiencing
a contentious attack on its domestic political system. Why was the policy process in both states
disorganized, and what different challenges did the United States and United Kingdom face?
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Chapter 3: Organizational Policy Decisions
Which factors shaped the U.S. and U.K. responses to the 2016 Russian disinformation
campaigns, resulting in similarly uncoordinated responses but more a limited one in the United
Kingdom? How does a bureaucratic politics approach shed light on the case studies? The
bureaucratic politics model can be applied to the U.S. and U.K. case studies to illuminate
important factors affecting policy in response to Russian disinformation. I begin Chapter 3 by
analyzing the U.S. case study. I first examine how the bureaucratic politics model can inform the
impact of actors’ standard operating procedures on their choices in the U.S. case study. I then
discuss how the U.S. case presents strong challenges to expectations of bargaining and
leadership in the process of policy formulation, challenging the analytical utility of bureaucratic
politics. Next, I discuss the importance of geopolitical context and how it affects and
complements the above factors. Then, I discuss the role of the Presidency, assessing how its
constraints and importance in creating leadership differ from those of other actors in the U.S.
case. Finally, I discuss how the U.K. case reveals the significance of a government’s institutional
structure, specifically the division or centralization of power, on bargaining and leadership in the
decision-making process. The analysis demonstrates that bureaucratic politics can generate key
insights, but that some of its predictions may be less robust without the domestic-consensusbuilding, bipolar competition that shaped foreign policy during the Cold War.

Bureaucratic Politics Applications to the U.S. Case Study
The bureaucratic politics model can be applied to the U.S. case study to help illuminate
some aspects of government interaction, such as reliance on standard operating procedure by
agencies and partisan division. The analytical leverage of standard operating procedure,
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however, depends somewhat on taking into account context, particularly the presence or absence
of a unifying threat. In addition, the U.S. case study poses challenges to the importance of
bargaining and leadership as key factors in the policy process as predicted by a bureaucratic
politics approach.

Standard Operating Procedures
Many of the U.S. actions taken in response to Russian election interference strongly
conform to the idea in bureaucratic politics that actors have defined roles and histories, and their
actions are selected from a set of standard operating procedures shaped by their areas of
responsibility and experiences. Examples of expected actions that can be illuminated by this
aspect of the approach include DoJ indictments, retaliatory hacking by the NSA and Cyber
Command, intelligence agencies issuing investigative reports, internal investigations by
Congressional oversight committees, and even to some degree partisan division by the President
and other political actors. Using bureaucratic politics to examine these actions, which constitute
a large portion of overall U.S. responses, reveals that the responses are not in fact as unusual or
unexpected as some of them were perceived to be at the time.
One of the primary options considered by the Obama Administration was economic
sanctions. Although sanctions are a standard response to provocations that do not rise to the level
of armed conflict, they ended up being one of the less significant aspects of the response in this
case.182 Interestingly, sanctions were of limited use in the 2016 response precisely because most
viable sanctions had already been imposed as a standard response to Russian actions like the
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2014 invasion of Ukraine to the degree that “the remaining economic options would incur
significant blowback to either the United States or its allies, notably the Europeans.”183 President
Obama’s initial executive order, which was codified into law by the 2017 CAATSA, did
implement some sanctions, though they were likely of low impact as they targeted figures in the
Russian intelligence agencies who were unlikely to be affected by U.S. sanctions.184
DoJ indictments and hacking back by U.S. Cyber Command were probably the clearest
examples of actors’ actions being derived from their standard operating procedures. The DoJ is
empowered to prosecute cases for the U.S. government, as well as defend the country against
foreign threats.185 The DoJ’s main tools are investigation, including special counsel investigations
followed by prosecution if illegal actions are uncovered. Following a special counsel
investigation, in February 2018, the DoJ issued indictments through a grand jury against
Russians involved in the IRA for breaking U.S. laws against hacking and fraud, among other
charges.186 The indictments fell exactly in line with the mission of the DoJ, as well as the FBI,
which operates under the DoJ: DoJ is empowered to enforce laws and protect U.S. interests,
including against foreign threats. In addition, the DoJ enforced the existing law around foreign
agents (FARA) by compelling RT to register as a foreign agent.187
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The U.S. Cyber Command was designed as the military command charged with leading
or coordinating cyber operations in order to protect national security, and like DoJ, this
institution hewed closely to the role defined in its mission statement in the aftermath of the
misinformation campaigns.188 U.S. Cyber Command worked with the NSA to inform the FBI and
DHS about election interference threats in the run up to the 2018 midterm elections.189 Cyber
Command’s actions were designed to disrupt Russian interference in U.S. elections as a
preventative before the 2018 midterms.190 Cooperation with other intelligence agencies to counter
threats to U.S. cyber infrastructure is standard for Cyber Command; for example, more recently
it cooperated with DHS on the response to the SolarWinds hack, which affected U.S.
government infrastructure.191
Reports issued by the DNI and Congressional reports and investigations were also
strongly aligned with the roles of those actors. Throughout the response process, numerous
intelligence reports, including the 2016 JAR and 2017 ICA, were issued by different agencies,
including DNI, DHS, FBI, CIA, and NSA. Congressional committees, in addition to drafting
legislation, are tasked with oversight and investigation of government actions.192 This
investigative and oversight role played a strong role in Congressional actions in response to 2016
Russian election interference. Committees relevant to the process, including the Senate Select
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Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, held
hearings to investigate and interview government actors such as former FBI Director James
Comey and issued reports that investigated election interference as well as the analytical
processes used by intelligence agencies to make their earlier determinations about interference.193
Not only did Congressional committees’ actions fall under their investigative mandates, but they
also were driven by their roles of providing government oversight in analyzing the 2016 election
and analytical procedures in the 2017 ICA.
Congressional actions also demonstrate the bureaucratic politics theory’s view that
organizations’ roles and procedures restrict the actions of individual members. Congress is an
organization comprised of partisan actors. While individual representatives are able to make
political statements, the collective organization of Congress and its procedures constrained
individual dissent. The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Report published in
2018 involved the most contentious conclusions, initially denying and then downplaying Russian
preference for President Trump, as well as restricting investigations of collusion allegations.194
Both Republican and Democratic actions were constrained by Congressional procedures.
Democrats were unable to force Republicans to include more information critical of President
Trump and were limited to publishing a supplement to the final report and issuing a statement in
protest, as they were in the minority. Ranking Member Adam Schiff published a response, in
addition to a supplementary Minority Views section added to the committee report, criticizing
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the majority investigation.195 However, Schiff was not able to break free of the limitations of
being part of the minority on the committee in order to change the report itself. On the other
hand, Republicans were similarly constrained from completely refuting the claim that Russia
supported President Trump, as they were unable to defend the claim and had to submit the report
for review by both the minority and Intelligence Community before publishing.196
However, one action seemingly contradicts the position that government actors behave in
accordance with their legal and historically defined roles. After President Trump voiced support
for Putin’s denials of election interference, President Trump’s own DNI, Dan Coats, took the
unusual step of directly refuting Trump’s support for the Russian assertion of innocence.197 The
DNI is a traditionally nonpartisan role.198 The position was created in 2004 to establish an
independent director to oversee the Intelligence Community, which itself is traditionally seen as
nonpartisan.199 In addition, the DNI is the primary intelligence advisor to the President and
NSC.200 Although these aspects of the role would seem to result in a low-profile, nonpartisan
actor predisposed to avoid conflict, DNI Coats made a public statement contradicting comments
made by President Trump.
Bureaucratic politics points to a potentially relevant context for DNI Coats’ statement.
While individual incentives are strongest among political actors, institutional actors also have
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goals beyond simply enacting standard operating procedure. All individual government actors,
including institutional ones, are driven to increase and protect their areas of influence and
authority.201 Possibly, in the face of deep Presidential animosity towards the Intelligence
Community and its conclusions, DNI Coats was attempting to protect the authority and
legitimacy of the DNI by distancing himself from the partisan statements made by Trump and
supporting the Intelligence Community he led.

Leadership
Although actions taken largely comported with bureaucratic roles and precedence, the
clear leadership role anticipated for one actor by a bureaucratic political approach did not
materialize in the U.S. case.202 Leadership is important to the policy formation process, as it
creates a space in which organizations can interact as a group and bargaining can occur. While a
couple of specific examples of effective cooperation and leadership involving a few, related
actors arose, the U.S. policy response process as a whole lacked a point person or organization.
Though there was no overall leader, a few specific examples in the U.S. case study
demonstrate the emergence of a point person. As the bureaucratic politics approach might
anticipate, President Obama’s initial response to Russian election interference was formed
through discussion with a small group of relevant individuals, including the DNI, CIA Director,
and Attorney General.203 The group eventually expanded to include the Departments of Defense,
State, and Treasury, as they were relevant to response options.204 This more deliberative type of
201
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policy process, in which stakeholders come together to discuss all potential options, is more
similar to the cases presented by Allison and Halperin because it involved the sort of group
collaboration they discussed with respect to the Cuban Missile Crisis and ABM deployment. As
part of the Obama administration response, the NSC encouraged the Intelligence Community
under the leadership of the DNI to come to a unified conclusion on Russian disinformation.205
While the ICA was not entirely unanimous and completion of the report took longer than the
NSC hoped as the NSA had a different standard for assessing confidence levels, the report was
mostly unified.206 In addition, the FBI had an interest in protecting its institutional reputation for
being nonpartisan and worried that public statements by the FBI about election security during
an election could be harmful to the institution, which was balanced by the NSC’s desire for to
respond strongly to the DNC hack and treat it like any other security breach.207 Unlike the lack of
cooperation after Trump’s inauguration, these signs of bargaining and actors’ distinct interests
reflected a U.S. response under President Obama consistent with expectations of bureaucratic
politics theory.
Joint intelligence reports as well as joint cyber campaigns reflected cooperation and
bargaining under the coordination of the DNI and Cyber Command whose missions most closely
conforms with the challenge of leading the response. The 2017 ICA is an example of cooperation
and compromise under the leadership of the DNI. The DNI coordinated the Intelligence
Community’s assessments in order to publish the JAR. While there was slight variation among
the analysis and focus of agencies’ conclusions, for example the NSA confidence level in
Russian preference towards Trump being lower, the agencies were able to publish a single,
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almost entirely unanimous report.208 In addition, while there are fewer details due to the covert
nature of the actions, U.S. Cyber Command coordinated with the NSA to identify and deter
Russian actors and to pass along information to the FBI and DHS.209
Despite these few specific instances where one actor was in charge of the process, the
overall government response, the majority of which took place under the Trump Administration,
lacked leadership. Victoria Nuland, the former Assistant Secretary of State for European and
Eurasian Affairs, in her testimony for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, specifically
criticized the absence of a “whole-of-government approach” led by the President.210 In the 2016
U.S. case, unlike Halperin’s ABM missile deployment example in which the President ultimately
made a single choice after input from different government actors, there was no identifiable
leading actor.211 This was not for lack of an existing mission-appropriate actor to whom to
delegate responsibility. DHS, for example, could have been designated by the President to
coordinate and lead all U.S. responses to election interference. DHS’s mission includes
responding to cyber incidents, including specifically coordinating the U.S. response “to ensure
greater unity of effort and a whole-of-nation response to cyber incidents,” so overall
responsibility would have been consistent with the DHS mission.212 However, several agencies
have relevant departments or missions including the FBI and U.S. Cyber Command, and so there
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was no single, clear, pre-existing delegation of authority for the overall response. Outside of the
one-time JAR issued in December 2016, no agency or actor took responsibility for coordinating
and communicating policy options.

Bargaining
Bargaining appears to be another relatively rare component of the U.S. policy formation
process, despite its prominence in bureaucratic politics. While bargaining does not always result
in compromise, the U.S. policy response process under the Trump administration involved little
collaborative or non-adversarial communication among government agencies, the President, and
Congress. Leadership and bargaining tend to occur together because leadership helps organize a
space in which bargaining can occur, which seems to be particularly important for large scale or
multilateral bargaining. Instead of collaborating and bargaining, various government actors with
different interests generally acted without consulting one another or coming to consensus. While
bureaucratic politics helps in analyzing the actions taken by independent organizations in all but
a few outlier cases, it is less helpful in the U.S. case for analyzing how organizations combined
and interacted to form a broader policy because, by and large, individual actions did not combine
to form a greater policy or strategy.
Enactment of the 2017 CAATSA superficially seemed like a compromise between
Congress and the Presidency. In reality, the 2017 CAATSA was passed by a large enough
margin that Trump would likely have faced an embarrassing veto override if he had refused to
sign, resulting both in failure to block the law and criticism from his own party.213 Regardless,
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President Trump issued a statement along with the signing detailing legal objections to the bill
that offered him the ability to affect how it was enforced, thereby eroding the impact of
Congressional action.214
While the actions of various government actors by necessity built on each other, under
the Trump administration, there was no overall guiding strategy or policy consensus from the
U.S. government. There was no documented meeting among Congressional leaders, President
Trump, and agency officials to discuss potential options, even one with only some actors or one
that did not lead to successful compromise. DoJ indictments, issued in February and July 2018
by a grand jury after presentation of the case by DoJ, were brought following the Mueller special
counsel investigation and 2017 ICA. Similarly, Congressional reports analyzed and confirmed
the 2017 ICA because they were oversight investigations meant to confirm and inspect the
process by which intelligence reports came about. However, these actions occurred sequentially
and reactively rather than as a result of multilateral, real-time discussions or in pursuit of an
overarching strategy.

Context
The bureaucratic politics approach was developed during the Cold War, which provided
an overarching context for U.S. foreign policy. The 2016 U.S. case suggests that some of the
theory’s assumptions based on the stability and consensus of the Cold War need to be adjusted
for the more fragmented priorities of modern foreign policy. The absence of context in
bureaucratic politics theory has previously attracted criticism, as organizations’ level of
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involvement, particularly the Presidency, can vary with the importance of an issue.215 During the
Cold War, there was bipartisan agreement that the Soviet Union was the main competitor of the
United States, with ideological conflict playing out around the world through proxy battles and
events such as the Cuban Missile Crisis and ABM deployment. Despite strains, by 2016 the
U.S.-Russian relationship was warmer, involving some cooperation, than during the Cold War,
and there was less consensus that Russia was an enemy of the United States. These contextual
shifts impact the influence of standard operating procedure, leadership, and bargaining,
broadening the parameters of debate over the U.S.-Russian relationship.
The Cold War was defined by several characteristics that influenced policymaking,
though at the time these characteristics may have simply been viewed as the largely immutable
default. Foreign policy consensus represents the most relevant of these characteristics to my
analysis. During the Cold War, there was a strong political consensus that the Soviet Union was
the United States’ primary competitor and enemy. 216 This consensus meant that politicians
shared a common cause, even if they had slightly different desired policies, making leadership
and collaboration easier. In contrast, by 2016 there was no longer consensus that Russia should
be viewed as an enemy of the U.S., and China was seen by many as the primary threat. As a
result, leadership, and therefore bargaining, are likely to occur less smoothly as actors may have
opposing views of the fundamental situation as well as optimal policy responses. In addition, the
Cold War international system was bipolar, with one major competitor to United States
hegemony. In contrast, the current international system is more complex but includes some
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multipolar characteristics.217 A multipolar system, or one with a less identifiable single
competitor, creates more competing issue areas for Presidential attention and leadership,
meaning that Russian election interference might be deprioritized in favor of other issues like
technology competition with China or Iran nuclear negotiations.
The effects of context on the relevance of standard operating procedure are more
nuanced. Standard operating procedures are relatively stable, an important assumption of
bureaucratic politics. Organizations accumulate experience and responsibilities, allowing them to
form standard operating procedures that evolve slowly over time in response to new challenges.
While bureaucratic politics explains that organizations will look to standard operating procedures
to formulate responses, it does not examine the constraints placed on the selection of standard
operating procedures by context. During the Cold War, while the United States made no overt
direct response to Soviet disinformation campaigns, it ran parallel covert disinformation
campaigns against Soviet-aligned politicians and groups in other countries.218 The consensus that
the Soviet Union was an enemy of the United States, as well as the increased urgency created by
the ideological aspect of the conflict and existential threat of nuclear weapons, enabled
government organizations to agree on more aggressive retaliation.219 Because the conflict
between the United States and Russia today is less ideologically driven and existential, actors
may not consider some standard operating procedures for lower level threats because of the
desire to avoid a risk of unnecessary escalation.
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The Complex Presidency
While Presidential actions are shaped by the traditional Presidential role, such as reliance
on executive branch agencies, conformity with party platforms, and wary treatment of
adversarial states, political institutions constrain individual imperatives less. Even the actions of
President Trump, who was strongly criticized for speaking against the investigations rejecting
allegations that Russia supported him and downplaying all election interference allegations, can
be illuminated by the theory that roles limit and influence actions. Analyzing the role of the
Presidency in the U.S. response to the Russian misinformation effort presents challenges due to
the strongly divergent analyses of President Trump’s response. Many of Trump’s actions shortly
after the election directly contradicting statements and actions taken by his predecessor,
President Obama, Congress, and executive agencies, were seen as aberrant, breaking ranks with
the stance of other major federal government actors, and were strongly criticized, including from
within his own party.220 In particular, President Trump’s denial that Russia interfered in the
election, rejection of conclusions made by traditionally apolitical intelligence agencies, and
attempts to create a less adversarial relationship with Russia were directly refuted by the
Republican Speaker of the House Paul Ryan.221 Shortly after Trump’s election in 2016, one
intelligence official said that the administration’s hostility to intelligence agencies put it in
“uncharted territory.”222
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Despite the backlash against Trump’s actions, they can be explained by how those
choices were shaped by standard operating procedure as informed by bureaucratic politics
theory. While stable, more nonpartisan organizations like the State Department are strongly
constrained by standard operating procedure, the Presidency is less constrained. The Presidency
is an elected role, and as a result, the President has both a partisan affiliation as well as individual
incentives such as achieving reelection. However, President Trump’s pre-Presidency positivity
towards Russia was not affected by the reelection imperative in his denial of Russian election
interference, as his friendliness predated his election.
In contrast to unelected, less partisan agencies, which are primarily driven by their roles
and past experience and subject to much weaker political and personal influence, in the case of
the Presidency the influence of the institutional mission of the Presidency and convention
compete with strong individual motivations. For example, President Trump’s actions were
influenced by the need to court public opinion and achieve reelection, while the CIA had no such
direct imperative. Trump’s campaign promises included reevaluating the U.S.-Russian
relationship including through increased cooperation against Islamic State, which meant that as
President he was incentivized to follow through with a friendlier and more collaborative posture
towards Russia, a stance challenged by the election interference allegations. In line with this
position, President Trump consistently downplayed or denied Russian interference in the 2016
election and opposed efforts to respond to it.
Allegations of Russian election interference, particularly the allegation that Russia had
favored him and attempted to encourage his election, also called into direct question President
Trump’s democratic legitimacy. This incentivized President Trump’s denials that Russia
interfered, particularly that Russia supported him, in order to protect his democratic legitimacy.
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He referred to allegations that Russia favored him as “just another excuse” that Hillary Clinton
lost and argued that “they have no idea if it’s Russia or China or somebody.”223 President Trump
is often seen as unique or an outlying case in his breaking of Presidential norms, but in fact, the
outlying element here is unusually high-profile foreign interference in a domestic election, which
connects Trump’s choices to his Presidential legitimacy and individual drive to be reelected.
While other foreign policy decisions can affect reelection prospects to the extent that voters favor
one policy or another, election interference is uniquely entangled with reelection itself and, as a
result, has an unusually direct effect on those actors who are the subject of the election in
question.224 Supporting efforts to retaliate against Russia would have been tacit acceptance that
his election was tainted by foreign influence. By opposing sanctions and retaliation, Trump
further attempted to discredit the existence of Russian election interference in the eyes of his
supporters and shore up his legitimacy. President Trump’s decision to break with the position of
leaders in the Republican Party was likely driven in part by his newcomer status to politics and
the potential that his supporters were anti-establishment and more connected to him than the
party.225 This perceived disconnect of his base of support from the Republican Party reduced the
conventional incentive for a President to cooperate with their party. Though President Trump’s
denial of Russian election interference disrupted leadership and bargaining in the wider U.S.
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response, Trump’s actions are unsurprising in the context of his individual interests and within
the constraints and incentives of his role as President.

Insights from the U.K. Case Study
The bureaucratic politics model was developed in response to several case studies of U.S.
policymaking and therefore tends to make certain assumptions based on the U.S. government
structure. The approach’s roots in the U.S. case are particularly notable in bureaucratic politics’
focus on separation of powers, such as Allison’s discussion of the Presidential power to persuade
under the governmental politics model.226 However, the primary assumption of bureaucratic
politics, that governments are made of multiple, interconnected organizations who have defined
roles and respond based on standard operating procedures, applies to all governments, as does
the assumption that sub-state systems rely on bargaining between multiple actors to create statelevel outcomes. The U.K. case challenges a bureaucratic politics framework, as the response was
largely dictated by Boris Johnson, the Prime Minister, instead of an actor with more experience
or a mission more directly connected to election interference, such as one of the U.K.
intelligence agencies. In addition, the U.K. intelligence agencies publicly distanced themselves
from the response to Russia’s Brexit election interference, despite the assertion by the U.K.
parliamentary investigation that defending the democratic process from foreign influence
“should fall to [the] intelligence and security Agencies.”227
While the responses of the United States and United Kingdom seem similar on the
surface, characterized by conflict within each government and relatively uncoordinated and
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limited overt actions, important differences between the cases exist. The U.K. response, unlike
that in the United States, superficially seems to have involved leadership and coordination by
one actor, which is what bureaucratic politics would anticipate when an issue falls under the
responsibility of several actors. However, despite superficial conformity with the bureaucratic
politics model, on closer examination, the U.K. case diverges even more from predictions of the
theory than the U.S. case. In the United Kingdom, despite the seeming relevance of the
intelligence agencies, MI5, MI6, and GCHQ, to the issue of election interference, policy was
ultimately controlled by PM Boris Johnson. Unlike the U.S. case, standard operating procedure
had relatively limited impact. In addition, leadership and bargaining appear to be disconnected in
the U.K. case. By contrast, in the United States, the Obama and Trump Administrations’ process
and outcomes appear to demonstrate leadership and bargaining going hand-in-hand, with the
Trump Administration demonstrating the absence of both.

Concentration of Power in the United Kingdom
The U.K.’s parliamentary democracy system of government, which concentrates more
authority in one organization, creates a different environment for organizational interaction than
the separation of powers of the U.S. Presidential democracy. Presidential systems, including that
of the United States, revolve around the separation between the executive and legislative
branches, devolving decision-making powers to different actors and lacking a singular decision
maker. Unlike the U.S. government, in which the President, Congress, and even agencies to
some degree have the authority to take independent action within a system of checks and
balances, legislative systems like the United Kingdom’s combine the executive and legislative
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roles in a unified hierarchy, with the head of the legislature serving as Prime Minister.228 While
the United States and United Kingdom both have bicameral legislative systems, in the United
Kingdom power rests with the Prime Minister, who is chosen by the majority party or coalition
in the House of Commons and is ultimately responsible for all policy decisions.229 Because the
executive and legislative roles are combined, they are never occupied by opposing parties. In
addition, power is more centralized because the executive leads the legislature, reducing the
number of independent actors and their ability to influence policy. In contrast, in the United
States the President is separate from Congress and regularly comes from the opposite party from
the Congressional majority, and thus often lacks legislative support to create policy.
The Prime Minister leads and appoints members of the Cabinet, which includes heads of
important departments and have similar functions to executive agencies in the United States.230
While the Prime Minister needs to retain the confidence of the House of Commons, a majority
vote of no confidence forces the majority party to elect a new Prime Minister and form a new
government, risking a loss of power, thus preventing votes of no confidence being used as
routine leverage against the Prime Minister.231
The centralization of power, combined with a fairly stable hold on that power, disrupts
the connection between leadership and bargaining in the U.K. case. Despite the emergence of
policy leadership, the process in the United Kingdom did not lead to collaboration and
bargaining among different actors in the government. The bureaucratic politics model seems
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specifically tailored towards the type of bargaining interaction that occurs in a system like the
United States in which there is separation of powers, and indeed it was designed with the
Presidential system of the United States in mind. While bargaining can occur in other systems,
there is more of an imperative within the U.S. system for the primary actor, such as the President
in Halperin’s analysis of ABM missile deployment, to take into account and incorporate the
preferences of other actors in decisions.232 Operating in a system with separation of powers, the
U.S. President often relies on others, typically Congress as it can pass legislation for major
changes, to implement promised policies. This leads to an incentive for more bargaining, as well
as the potential for organizations with greater independence. When Johnson was deciding
whether and when to release the report on the U.K. response to 2016 Russian disinformation, he
did not have the same type of incentives to bargain or compromise with other actors, who were
ultimately responsible to him through the U.K.’s unified power structure. Despite protests from
the former parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee chair as well as opposition
politicians that the report should be published before the election, Johnson delayed the report
until several months after the 2019 general election.233 The report was allegedly delayed as it
contained potentially embarrassing evidence that Russia attempted to influence senior figures in
the Conservative Party.234 A unitary system like that in the United Kingdom leaves more space
for individual interests to dominate organizational politics. Thus, the U.K. parliamentary system
appears more consistent with generation of leadership than the U.S. due to unification of power,
even as it challenges the idea that leadership and bargaining go hand in hand.
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Organizational Self-Preservation
Interestingly, intelligence agencies played a small part in the U.K. response, even though
their designated areas of responsibility, which traditionally include counterintelligence, would
logically dictate that they would be involved with or even coordinate the response. The extreme
caution of U.K. intelligence agencies about being involved in the response to election
interference has been attributed to a reluctance to appear to interfere with U.K. democracy.235 In
the United States, the initial response process of the Obama administration also demonstrated
some of this hesitancy around democracy and perceptions; however, the U.S. government took
action even before the November 2016 election.236 It is unclear why U.K. intelligence agencies
were so reluctant to play a role in the U.K. response while U.S. actors overcame their hesitancy
around perceptions. Possibly the U.K. intelligence agencies were choosing not to act in order to
protect their institutions and institutional reputations for avoiding politics, analogous to the case
of DNI Coats in the United States. The governing Conservative Party had an incentive, like that
of Trump, not to emphasize Russian interference because of fears of undermining the legitimacy
of the Tory government. However, U.S. intelligence agencies independently investigated the
Russian disinformation campaign in line with their mandates, despite President Trump’s
opposition, while the U.K agencies did not. In the more centralized U.K. system, greater control
over the whole government by the executive may have dissuaded intelligence agencies from
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becoming involved and potentially increased intelligence agencies’ instincts to protect their
organizations. It nonetheless remains strange and inconsistent with the expectations of
bureaucratic politics theory that U.K. agencies did not perform even a small-scale public
investigation or, if they privately investigated, reveal evidence of Russian interference.

Conclusion
What challenges do Russian election interference and disinformation, specifically in the
U.S. and U.K. in 2016 elections, pose for bureaucratic politics theory? Can bureaucratic politics
theory shed light on the allegedly partisan and ineffective policy formation processes in response
to that interference? Why did the U.S. and U.K. responses differ in scale? Bureaucratic politics
theory provides a useful, but limited, lens to analyze these cases and attempts to answer these
questions, deepening the analysis beyond the public narrative of partisanship by focusing on the
institutions over individuals. However, bureaucratic politics theory also has limitations in these
cases. Bureaucratic politics seems strongest when applied to relatively stable issues, such as
potentially the long U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, that are more closely analogous to the
Cold War cases for which the theory was developed and faces greater challenges when applied to
rapidly evolving and fragmentary issues like the use of social media disinformation to attack
elections.
In the U.S. case, bureaucratic politics reveals the relevance of actors’ roles and standard
operating procedures in guiding and constraining their choices and seemed to predict responses
relatively effectively. Many U.S. actions were based on standard operating procedure, such as
the DNI reports and DoJ special counsel investigations resulting in indictments. However, the
U.S. case challenges the narrative that leadership and bargaining play a significant role in the
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policy process, particularly with respect to the Trump administration’s response. President
Trump was specifically criticized for the absence of a “Presidentially led, whole-of-government
effort” necessary to protect U.S. democracy.237 While there were limited or shorter-duration
examples of leadership and bargaining, such as the Obama administration’s reliance on the NSC
for decision making, the overall U.S. response was defined by a lack of compromise and
cooperation. All of the factors proposed by bureaucratic politics theory were influenced by
changes in the geopolitical context since the theory was proposed during the Cold War. With the
ideological struggle and urgency of the Cold War gone and lack of broad foreign policy
consensus that Russia is an enemy of the United States, the pressure for leadership and
bargaining has been greatly reduced and standard operating procedure is more constrained. In the
future, the U.S. government could potentially improve responses to disinformation by expressly
delegating responsibility for disinformation policy to non-elected, less partisan organizations;
however, the challenge remains that the President could likely reclaim effective control if
motivated to do so.
The U.K. case reveals even deeper challenges to bureaucratic politics theory, perhaps in
part because the bureaucratic politics model was initially developed with the U.S. Presidential
system in mind. While Prime Minister Johnson took leadership for the response consistent with
the single leader hypothesis, he was a self-interested leader on election interference and used his
position to obstruct other actors with relevant missions, such as U.K. intelligence agencies,
instead of collaborating with them. The U.K. government’s response may have been limited in
part because it has a larger number of veto points than the United States, preventing independent
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action and allowing the Prime Minister to suppress opposing policies more effectively. In
addition, the UK intelligence agencies, MI5, MI6, and GCHQ, took no public action to counter
or investigate the Russian disinformation campaign despite the fact that it fell directly under their
responsibilities and they counter other types of Russian interference in the United Kingdom,
perhaps because of institutional preservation motives consistent with bureaucratic politics.238 The
United Kingdom could potentially help reduce intelligence agencies’ hesitance to get involved in
countering disinformation by making their responsibility to protect U.K. democracy, and
elections specifically, explicit.

Looking Ahead
Ultimately, both the United States and United Kingdom struggled to form a coherent and
collaborative policy process. A bureaucratic politics approach reveals the lack of leadership and
coordination in the United States, as well as both the lack of compromise and effective
fulfillment of responsibilities in the U.K. response. Despite substantially different governmental
structures, the policy processes of both countries were challenged in responding to
disinformation. Democracy and democratic institutions themselves may even be part of the
challenge. As noted, election interference threatens the democratic legitimacy of leaders, creating
an inherent incentive to suppress and ignore the issue instead of leading a rigorous, wholegovernment policy response. While separation of powers in the United States enabled more
actors to act independently, in many cases their diverging interests and goals led to oppositional
behavior and a chaotic response, indicating that independent action is not likely to be as effective
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as a well-led, coordinated, planned response. In the United Kingdom, unified power did allow for
leadership to emerge, though not necessarily in the right place or with objectives that best
protected national security, and correspondingly led other actors to abrogate their institutional
responsibilities. Although the unified power structure of the parliamentary system appears more
consistent with leadership generation, its greater veto potential challenges the linkage between
leadership and bargaining. There is a paradox between struggles to establish leadership under
one system and the disconnect between leadership and compromise in the other.
The challenges highlighted by my analysis raise the question of how democracies can
respond effectively to the threat of disinformation. Sharp power, including disinformation
campaigns in democratic elections, is difficult to counter because it involves a closed society
attacking an open one. The United States and other democracies are particularly vulnerable
because they allow a free flow of information, media, and debate, while more authoritarian
countries like Russia have tighter control over information and may feel less constrained by
international norms. Therefore, while Russian state media like RT and Sputnik, in addition to
groups like the IRA, operate in a variety of Western countries, the United States is unable to
retaliate openly in kind against Russia for a variety of reasons. These include a potential
weakening of international norms against domestic interference and strengthening Russia’s
narrative that the United States interferes in Russia and near abroad states. Russia’s contrasting
willingness to challenge international norms allows it to interfere in democracies with only a thin
veneer of deniability. However, democracies may paradoxically rely on covert actions, like nonpublic ultimatums or retaliatory hacking, that allow them to maintain a public moral high ground
while take retaliatory or defensive actions, even as they are perceived as weak or ineffective.
Disinformation thus seems to invite less democratic solutions, potentially reducing the control of
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democratically elected officials over agencies, and more oversight of the flow of information to
cut off foreign disinformation, potentially undermining democratic values of free speech and
privacy. Democracies must balance the need to defend democracy from illiberal actors like
Russia while minimizing reductions in democratic openness in the process.
Deterrence offers an appealing way for democracies to counter disinformation, focusing
on the source of disinformation rather than worrying about democratic vulnerability.
Democracies could increase the cost of foreign disinformation campaigns, altering the costbenefit calculations for such campaigns, by clearly enumerating retaliatory measures for
disinformation campaigns and following through on them in the event of an attack. However,
deterrence also shines light on some of the challenges of a response focusing on Russia and
Russian motivations. Because disinformation is a non-military attack, policy response options
are realistically constrained by the risk of escalation. Democratic governments have a limited set
of standard tools they can use to respond to non-military conflict, relying heavily on sanctions
and public condemnation. Sanctions, and potentially public condemnation, become less effective
or limited by overuse, so different policy objectives may be competing for the same tools,
making them less available or effective as a deterrent against disinformation. As noted, this
frequent use appeared to have limited the utility of sanctions against Russian 2016 election
interference. Tools like indictment are unlikely to provide a strong deterrent effect in foreign
policy, as targets typically live abroad. Such measures also often provoke a tit-for-tat response
that must be considered. These challenges are heightened by the special complications associated
with cyber deterrence. In addition, the divisive effects of disinformation on domestic politics
make it challenging to muster a whole-government collaboration, as seen in both the U.S. and
U.K. cases. Partisanship is particularly problematic for deterrence, as clear messaging is
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important, and mixed messages from different government actors disrupt the credibility of
deterrence.
Ultimately, both bureaucratic politics theory and deterrence are limited by their focus
solely on interactions within government, failing to account for key non-governmental actors like
social media companies. While the U.S. and U.K. government policy processes were challenged
in responding to a technologically advanced, domestic political attack, independent government
action was not the only option for countering Russian disinformation. Private sector and
coordinated public-private sector efforts have the potential to represent essential means of
addressing the issue going forward. While the growth of social media allowed disinformation to
become much more effective, collaboration with social media companies also provides a new
avenue for addressing disinformation. In 2017, the Senate and House Intelligence Committees
held hearings with representatives from major social media companies to discuss Russian
disinformation in 2016, allowing Congress to pressure companies including Facebook and
Twitter to address Russian disinformation, as well as domestic and other foreign disinformation,
more effectively.239 Around the time of the hearings, several companies pledged to verify
political advertisement purchasers and provide additional transparency around political activity
on their platforms.240 While the federal government is able to address disinformation at its source
by engaging with Russia directly, social media companies are able to address the disinformation
and distribution itself by suppressing or removing disinformation networks and actors, and
potentially reworking algorithms to deprioritize contentious topics or siloed communities. Their
collaboration may be especially helpful given the rapidly evolving nature of the technology used
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to promote disinformation and the relatively slower pace of bureaucratic action. Ultimately,
disinformation can be most effectively addressed wholistically as not just as foreign policy, but
also as a technology, media, and education issue.
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Methodology
My analysis and background include major actions by federal government actors, such as
bills, investigations, official statements, and executive orders. In addition, I include some
comments in my analysis where they add important context to actions, such as President
Trump’s discussion of and signing of the CAATSA bill. Most bills are initiated and formed by
Congress, and signing by the President is secondary, so the policy is attributed to Congress. In
the U.S. case, I use a cutoff of the 2018 midterms as any policies after the midterms cannot
clearly be identified as a response to 2016. I chose to exclude from my analysis informal
remarks, routine activities such as Presidential signing of bills, and policy implemented after the
2018 midterms. I exclude informal remarks because, due to the contentious and highly
publicized nature of Russian disinformation in the U.S. election, there are a very large number of
remarks.
In order to compile my timeline of events for the disinformation campaigns, I relied on
news, think tank, and social media analysis reports, as well as to a lesser degree government
post-incident reports. Four years later, the basic facts of the U.S. case study are fairly well
established; the UK case study has been researched less, and therefore has less data available. As
a result, I relied more on information that the U.K. government collected several years after the
Brexit referendum. In both cases, the timeline of government policies was assembled by
combining news reports and think tank lists of policy actions, and searching for relevant policy
actions on the websites of important actors, including the U.S. President, U.K. Prime Minister,
and Congressional intelligence committees.
There are a large number of relevant terms and phrases that can be used to refer to
Russian actions during the 2016 U.S. election. I primarily use the terms election interference,
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disinformation, and disinformation campaign because they are relatively specific and accurate to
the cases. Other relevant terms include sharp power, foreign malign influence, information
warfare, and foreign election interference. Less formal terms include fake news and propaganda.
Misinformation, though occasionally used, is an inaccurate description of Russian actions in
2016 because the concept of misinformation lacks intentionality, while disinformation involves
intentionally spreading incorrect or misleading information.241
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